Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 49

Number 3

Article 3

12-2022

A Candle in the Labyrinth: A Guide for Immigration Attorneys to
Assert Habeas Corpus after DHS v. Thuraissigiam
Joshua J. Schroeder

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joshua J. Schroeder, A Candle in the Labyrinth: A Guide for Immigration Attorneys to Assert Habeas
Corpus after DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 49 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237 (2022).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol49/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

A Candle in the Labyrinth:
A Guide for Immigration Attorneys to Assert
Habeas Corpus after DHS v. Thuraissigiam
BY JOSHUA J. SCHROEDER*

Abstract††
In the summer of 2020, immigration law seemed to become the gravitational center of presidential power. After the Supreme Court decided several immigration cases in favor of the executive department, former President Trump cited “the DACA case” to support a new constitutional theory
that “[t]he Supreme Court gave the president of the United States powers
that nobody thought the president had.” Accordingly, Trump began to issue
presidential legislation including “an immigration plan, a health care plan,
and various other plans.”
Trump also began to occupy cities that were politically opposed to his
presidency with ICE and CBP agents, including BORTAC (“Border Patrol
Tactical Unit”), citing a pretext of defending federal buildings from protesters. Finally on January 6, 2021, Trump attempted to force Congress to decide the election in his favor by inciting a violent insurrection of pro-Trump
protesters. The desecration of the U.S. Capitol Building that followed made
the Trump administration’s former pretext of defending federal buildings
from protesters appear as nothing more than a ruse.
The U.S. legal community had reason to hope that habeas corpus might
have blocked Trump’s extraconstitutional exertions of power, because
Boumediene v. Bush assured us that “the writ of habeas corpus is itself an

* Joshua J. Schroeder is owner and founder of SchroederLaw in Oakland, CA where he practices
immigration law, constitutional law, and intellectual property law. He holds a J.D. from Lewis &
Clark Law School, and is admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the State Bar of California, and the Oregon
State Bar. This article is dedicated to my friends Johanna Torres, Ginger Jacobs, and Bashir Ghazialam.
†† The abstract quotes and refers to sources cited infra at notes 11, 88, 242–43.
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indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.” However, in the summer of 2020 the U.S. Supreme Court decided DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, which seemed to imply that the processes of ICE and CBP
were beyond the reach of habeas corpus just as Trump used those agencies
to occupy Portland, Oregon and other localities across the nation.
In response, this article asserts six approaches inspired by Boumediene
v. Bush to distinguish Thuraissigiam and to help the Court reassert itself as
a check in the balance of power. The analysis below is geared toward drafting immigrant habeas petitions, but its principles may be applied to habeas
writs generally. For immigration law is not a proper exception to habeas
corpus, which, to quote Thomas Jefferson, exists in a grand manner to ensure
that “[t]he military shall be subordinate to the civil power.”
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Introduction: Rising Up in the Shadow of DHS v. Thuraissigiam
In 1807, President Jefferson issued deportation orders that imprisoned
a famous German immigrant named Eric Bollman.1 When the court issued
a writ of habeas corpus to release Bollman, he was released into the United
States.2 Given the existence of several cases like Ex parte Bollman around
the founding era, it is unsettling that Thuraissigiam dismissed an immigrant
habeas petition on a 12(b)(1) motion, before even reaching the merits of the
writ.3
Thuraissigiam dismissed a habeas writ expressly because the habeas
petition was drafted incorrectly.4 In Thuraissigiam, failure to request the
common law remedy of habeas release in the petition itself was fatal to the
habeas petition.5 Furthermore, Thuraissigiam attached a panoply of complex
dicta to a simple 12(b) dismissal, including a strong statement of plenary
power doctrine,6 and a rationale for why immigrants potentially have no constitutional rights.7
Thus, even if future habeas petitions satisfy Thuraissigiam’s new drafting forms, they may still fail along the lines of Thuraissigiam’s dicta.8 For
example, even though Thuraissigiam was asserted in a case of an immigrant
seeking legal entry into the United States, it was the sole decision cited to
vacate Ragbir v. Homan, a case involving a lawful permanent resident
(“LPR,” i.e., an immigrant already granted legal entry into the United
States).9 Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Ragbir, when Boumediene’s

1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Wilkinson (Feb. 3, 1807); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to William C.C. Claiborne (Feb. 3, 1807). Cf. Paul Sweet, Erich Bollmann at Vienna in
1815, 46 AM. HIST. REV. 580, 582, 586 (1941) (explaining how and why “Bollmann cut loose from
the United States,” and did not return after defeating Jefferson in court).
2. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 136 (1807).
3. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1973 (2020).
4. Id. at 1969–75.
5. Id. at 1969.
6. Id. at 1982.
7. Id. at 1982–83.
8. Id.; see id. at 2013 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that while the majority’s opinion
may be limited to its facts: “[w]here its logic must stop, however, is hard to say.”). But see Al Otro
Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *42 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (“the
language in Thuraissigiam is mere dicta”); id. at *62–63, *72 (showing how Thuraissigiam’s dicta
about due process, though disappointing and limiting, need not actually stand in the way of judicial
review).
9. Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 78 (2d Cir. 2019), vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S.
Ct. 227 (2020) (exclusively citing DHS v. Thuraissigiam to vacate Ragbir on a writ of certiorari).
Cf. Matter of N-V-G-, 28 I.&N. Dec. 380, 384 (B.I.A. Sept. 17, 2021); Al Otro Lado, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *42 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982–83).
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holdings are followed the chances that an immigrant habeas petition will
succeed sharply increase.10
Boumediene expressly recognized that “foreign nationals who have the
privilege of litigating in our courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers
principles.”11 Boumediene extended the privilege of seeking the enforcement of the separation of powers through habeas corpus to foreign nationals
suspected of terrorism and held in a black site in Cuba, making the bar for
this privilege exceedingly low.12 Boumediene crystalized the outer limits of
the privilege of habeas corpus into six common law holdings, which are:
(1) 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) is completely overruled as a Suspension of the
Writ; (2) noncitizen aliens suspected by the Government of committing war crimes have the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus [and
thereby hold an inherent, explicit, and fundamental privilege of litigating the separation of powers in federal court]; (3) the Writ does not
have a geographic limitation and may be asserted against any custodian the U.S. Courts have jurisdiction over including U.S. military officers that run black sites in foreign countries; (4) prudential bases for
dismissing the Writ like exhaustion and federalism are not relevant;
(5) the Court has the power to issue orders directing the conditional or
unqualified release of prisoners unlawfully detained; and (6) the Court
has power to hear exculpatory evidence not presented in the hearing
below.13

10. Ragbir, 923 F.3d at 73–74 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745–46 (2008)),
vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227 (2020). Cf. Daniel E. Simon, Immigration, Retaliation, and Jurisdiction, 2020 U. CHIC. L. FORUM 477, 482.
11. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)).
12. Id. at 732–34 (“We hold these petitioners do have the habeas corpus privilege.”).
13. Joshua J. Schroeder, Conservative Progressivism in Immigrant Habeas Court: Why
Boumediene v. Bush is the Baseline Constitutional Minimum, 45 THE HARBINGER 46, 47–49
(2020) [hereinafter Schroeder, Conservative] (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33, 751, 762–
64, 779, 786–87, 792–94) (expounding these six holdings); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743, 746, 765
(repeatedly confirming that foreign nationals have the explicit, inherent, and fundamental right to
litigate about the separation of powers in federal court under the Suspension Clause by stating: “the
writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers”). Boumediene overruled a jurisdiction stripping provision that is strikingly similar to several
jurisdiction stripping provisions Congress sprinkled throughout immigration law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e), overruled by Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (“28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ”). Prior to Boumediene several cases interpreted congressional
attempts to strip habeas jurisdiction from immigrant suits as narrow or inapplicable, in order to
avoid overruling the statutes as unconstitutional suspensions of the writ: see, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001) (rejecting the government’s argument “that four sections of the 1996
statutes—specifically, § 401(e) of AEDPA and three sections of IIRIRA (8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1),
1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) . . .— stripped the courts of jurisdiction to decide the question of
law presented by respondent’s habeas corpus application”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687
(2001) (interpreting previous alleged jurisdiction stripping provisions narrowly, writing: “the primary federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts
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Prior to arriving at the merits of any such challenge, Thuraissigiam dismissed an immigrant’s petition for not requesting the relief indicated in
Boumediene’s fifth holding above.14 In light of Thuraissigiam, a habeas petition should probably include a reference to each of Boumediene’s holdings
to avoid a similar dismissal.15 The purpose of this article is to discuss ways
to improve immigrant habeas petition writing in order to avoid a pre-merits
dismissal like Thuraissigiam and to increase an immigrant’s ultimate
chances of success.16
This article provides a guide to improve immigrant habeas petition writing in six parts as follows: (I) never refer to Immigration Court as a “civil”
court in habeas filings; (II) state that prudential barriers (like exhaustion) do
not legitimately exist in habeas cases; (III) assert the habeas corpus standard
of de novo review of law and fact; (IV) ask the federal court to administer
the common law habeas remedy; (V) explain how the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR” or “Immigration Court”) structurally fails to
secure common law due process; and (VI) flip the script of the so-called plenary power doctrine.

I. Never Refer to Immigration Court as “Civil” Court in Habeas
Filings
In habeas corpus review a “civil court” is synonymous with a common
law court presided over by an independent Article III judge or equivalent
state level court.17 The opposite of “civil” in the habeas context is military

to hear these cases”); but see Thoung v. United States, 913 F.3d 999, 1002 (10th Cir. 2019) (deciding that the REAL ID Act stripped the court’s habeas jurisdiction at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), without
considering the requirements of Boumediene under the Suspension Clause).
14. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1975.
15. See Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 13, at 47–49. See also Simon, supra note 10, at
482.
16. This article reiterates and extends the six holdings of Boumediene in several ways, including at the following footnotes: see infra notes 214–22 (asserting and extending holding 1); infra
notes 33, 43–44 (asserting and extending holding 2); infra note 72 (asserting and extending holding
3); infra notes 54–111 (asserting and extending holding 4); infra notes 166–222 (asserting and
extending holding 5); infra notes 83–87 (asserting and extending holding 6). Cf. Ragbir v. Homan,
923 F.3d 53, 53 (2d Cir. 2019), vac’d sub nom. Pham v. Ragbir, 141 S. Ct. 227 (2020).
17. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (“We hold that Congress
cannot subject civilians like Toth to trial by court-martial. They, like other civilians, are entitled to
have the benefit of safeguards afforded those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article III of
the Constitution.”). See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304, 317, 322–23 (1946) (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940)); Chambers, 309 U.S. at 237, 237 n.10 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl. & art. I, § 9,
cl. 2—footnote 10 in Chambers cites to several sources that trace to the beginning of habeas corpus
in England that are omitted here); Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25 (quoting THE DECLARATION OF
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or martial court; in the habeas context civil refers to civilian court, and it
includes both state and federal criminal courts.18 Habeas review is strongest
when reviewing federal non-civil incarceration, i.e., habeas is most powerful
when it reviews non-civil federal entities,19 like Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), Customs & Border Protection (“CBP”), or EOIR,20 for
detaining or incarcerating a person without being accountable to the checks
and balances required under the U.S. Constitution.21
Executive tribunals and agencies, while the legal community is presently accustomed to interacting with them, are not civil tribunals in the habeas sense.22 The existence of a “civil” enabling law does not make EOIR,
or Judge Advocates General’s Corp (“JAG”) for that matter, civil in the habeas sense.23 The idea of civil or civilian courts in habeas corpus law is
synonymous with what England called common law courts, such that the
absence of common law due process in a court collaterally reviewed by a
habeas writ can render it subject to reversal as illegitimate coram non judice.24

INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776) (“He [the king of England] has affected to render the Military
independent and superior to the Civil Power.”)).
18. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786 (“Military courts are not courts of record.”), citing and extending Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 209 (1830) (“[A] court martial had no jurisdiction over a
person not belonging to the militia, and its sentence in such a case being coram non judice, furnishes
no protection to the officer who executes it”).
19. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783 (“Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than,
say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing.”).
See Simon, supra note 10, at 482.
20. Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the
Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 433, 488–503 (1992) (explaining the non-adversarial, inquisitorial structure of
EOIR, ICE, and CBP). Cf. Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the Demise of the Star
Chamber, 50 AM. J. L. HIST. 326, 335 (2008–2010) (showing how the Star Chamber of England
was eventually disbanded for using “a secretive, inquisitorial method”); Habeas Corpus Act 1640,
16 Car. 1 c. 10 [Eng.] (abolishing the Star Chamber and confirming that the common law writ of
habeas corpus prefers the adversarial process to inquisitions).
21. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (“the Framers deemed the writ to be an essential mechanism
in the separation-of-powers scheme”). Cf. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 69.
22. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783, 786; id. at 829 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Duncan, 327 U.S. at
317, 322–23; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 67 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.10(a) (“The immigration judges are attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as administrative judges . . . . Immigration judges shall act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the
cases that come before them.”); Simon, supra note 10, at 482.
23. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218–19 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) (“‘Executive imprisonment has been
considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be
imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land. The judges of England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to preserve these
immunities from executive restraint.’”). Cf. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 67 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
24. See cases cited supra note 18.
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Some immigration experts understandably prefer to reduce their dayto-day level of secondary trauma by characterizing Immigration Court as a
proper common law court.25 Building up Immigration Court as a legitimate
tribunal may be a good strategy for litigating within Immigration Court.26
However, referring to Immigration Court as a legitimate common law court
in a habeas corpus petition can justify summary dismissal.27
When reviewing a fellow civil court, many federal judges feel strong
inclinations to defer to a fellow judge who is also tasked with applying the
common law requirements in our constitutions.28 EOIR is not one of these
courts; Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are not equals with common law judges,
in part, because the president can treat IJs as direct subordinates such that
removal and other punishments may be applied to any IJs that disobey presidential orders.29 Their jobs, unlike Article III judges, are retained only by
obeying executive orders, which may force IJs to keep immigrants detained
or to deport them in an attempt to deter legal immigration.30
25. See Hannah C. Cartwright et al., Vicarious Trauma and Ethical Obligations for Attorneys
Representing Immigrant Clients: A Call to Build Resilience Among the Immigration Bar, 2 AILA
L.J. 1, 28 (2020).
26. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N.H. L. REV. 1, 5, 52 (2012).
27. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 676–77 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(Scalia unsuccessfully pushed for this ground of dismissal in the military context saying: “Though
military commissions likewise do not implicate ‘the peculiar demands of federalism,’ considerations of interbranch comity at the federal level weigh heavily against our exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case.”). See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). Cf. Cartwright
et al., supra note 25, at 28.
28. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2503 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983)) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 738–
39 (overruling Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)) (“such second-guessing disrespects ‘the independence of state courts,’ and the State itself”); Fay, 372 U.S. at 449 n.1, 451 n.4 & n.6, 457 n.12
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 448 n. 12, 451 (1963)). See DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140
S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2021) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.42(c), (d)(1)) (deferring to EOIR and ICE based
on the implied presumption that these are civil courts that “‘shall make a de novo determination’”
when they are obviously not).
29. National Association of Immigration Judges, 71 F.L.R.A. 1046 (2020) (“we . . . find that
IJs are management officials, and, therefore, exclude them from the bargaining unit”); see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 160 (1943) (“A denaturalization suit is not a criminal proceeding. But neither is it an ordinary civil action, since it involves an important adjudication of
status.”); cf. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020) (deciding that the separation
of powers applies “everywhere except the Presidency”); Death Penalty Cases in Traffic Court Setting, IMMIGRANT L. CTR. MINN. (Mar. 31, 202), https://www.ilcm.org/latest-news/death-penaltycases-in-traffic-court-setting/; Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 334–36 (2007) (observing the random way asylum grants are
doled out by IJs).
30. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 69 (1866). IJs and ICE Officials are
“minions that skulk about under the pay of an executive.” Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (federal
judges “hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services,
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EOIR is therefore akin to a military tribunal over which habeas review
should be applied at the height of its potency.31 Immigration advocates
should argue that Thuraissigiam is distinguished for falsely presuming that
immigrants are treated better than the petitioners in Boumediene.32 They
should quote to Boumediene’s holdings, including “that at common law a
petitioner’s status as an alien was not a categorical bar to habeas corpus relief,” and furthermore that non-civil, military courts like EOIR are illegitimate coram non judice.33
Some non-immigration legal professionals strongly resist arguments
that could overturn administrative agency law.34 They may see the costs paid
by immigrants in EOIR as a worthwhile tradeoff for the opportunity of other
agencies to solve problems like environmental issues.35 But this perspective
gets the cart before the horse by deemphasizing cases like Ng Fung Ho v.
White and Liu Hop Fong v. United States that inspired federal jurists to expand administrative law in Crowell v. Benson.36
a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”). See, e.g., Joel
Rose, Justice Department Rolls Out Quotas For Immigration Judges, NPR (Apr. 3, 2018, 1:09
PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/03/599158232/justice-department-rolls-out-quotas-for-immigration-judges.
31. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783 (“Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than,
say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing.”);
Greg Jaffe, Missy Ryan, & Nick Miroff, Pentagon Set To Expand Military Role Along Southern
Border, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/pentagon-set-to-expand-military-role-along-southern-border/2019/04/26/f2b04666-682a11e9-82ba-fcfeff232e8f_story.html; Christine Lockhart Poarch, Immigration Court Reform: Congress, Heed the Call, THE FED. LAWYER, (Oct./Nov. 2016), https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Imm-Law-pdf-1.pdf (noting the irony of immigration lawyers continuing to
bill EOIR as “civil” when everyone knows “immigration court proceedings are not really civil at
all”); Tess Hellgren et al., The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, SPLC & INNOVATION LAW LAB, June 25, 2019, at 19,
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policyreport_the_attorney_generals_judges_final.pdf (quoting IJ Hon. Dana Leigh Marks: “‘The ‘deployment’ of judges to the border . . . does
imply a military force . . . .’”).
32. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1965.
33. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 747, 786, 792.
34. Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 32 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 101 (2018) [hereinafter Family, Immigration]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN 7–8, 42 (2020) (citing Wong Sung Yang v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950)) (upstaging Ng Fung Ho and Liu Hop Fong with the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) according to the derivative immigrant habeas case Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath).
35. See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN.
L. REV. 565, 615 (2012) [hereinafter Family, Administrative]; SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note
34, at 50 (emphasizing hard environmental issues).
36. Compare SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 34, at 42, Family, Administrative, supra
note 35, at 615, and Family, Immigration, supra note 34, at 101, with James E. Pfander, Article I
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643,
659–62, n.62 (2004), and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60–61 (1932) (citing Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922) (citing Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U.S. 453, 461
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It is not helpful to distinguish Boumediene and the other 9/11 habeas
cases from ordinary, run of the mill immigrant detentions as “core” versus
“non-core” habeas.37 As emphasized by Thuraissigiam, if a habeas petition
does not request core relief it may be dismissed,38 but as noted by Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, emphasizing a “core” claim can create a rationale to dismiss as
well.39 Thuraissigiam and Padilla stand out as exceptions for using a distinction between “core” and “non-core” as the central basis of their holdings
and dismissals.40
It is not problematic to use a “core” metaphor to describe what habeas
corpus is “at its core,”41 but this metaphor becomes ironic when it is used to
make rigid categories for formal dismissal.42 Going forward, no distinction
should be made between aliens held in military prisons like Guantanamo Bay
and those held in immigrant detention facilities.43 For “at its core,” the writ
“is not ‘a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,’”
(1908) (“the law contemplates that he shall be given the right of a hearing de novo before the district
judge before he is ordered to be deported”))). As Professor Kelly Lytle Hernández recently explained “the federal government deported fewer than 1,000 immigrants annually until the 1920s,
amounting to just .01 percent of the one million immigrants who entered the country every year,”
and thus several cases like Liu Hop Fong and Ng Fung Ho arose to contest the rights of naturalized
Asian American citizens to resist deportation when the narrow bases for deportation at the time
went wide of their target, as the earliest immigration laws “rarely prevented Mexicans from crossing the border.” KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, BAD MEXICANS 77, 163–65 (2022). These cases
included claims of U.S. citizenship, some might have been those referred to as paper sons, and they
might have also featured evidence of non-Chinese heritage as “Chinese immigrants often tried to
pass for Mexican, cutting their hair, donning serapes, and learning a few words of Spanish. ‘Yo soy
Mexicano,’ they would say when stopped by an immigration inspector.” Id. at 77; see Lisa See,
‘Paper Sons,’ Hidden Pasts, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-aug-02-oe-see2-story.html; see, e.g., Sibray v. United States ex rel. Yee Yok
Yee, 227 F. 1, 4–5 (3d Cir. 1915) (noting a certificate of identity that read that Yee Kong was the
“son of [an] official”).
37. See, e.g., Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971. Core versus non-core metaphors are used in
other areas as well, and may have a broader role in facilitating confusion in the law by making
chaotic systems appear to be ordered and methodical when they are not. See, e.g., Joshua J.
Schroeder, Choosing an Internet Shaped by Freedom: A Legal Rationale to Rein in Copyright Gate
Keeping, 2 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 48, 50 (2013) [hereinafter Schroeder, Choosing] (repeating the FCC’s use of “core” heavy regulation for “internet service providers” versus “non-core”
lighter regulation on “online service providers,” when perhaps the distinction between internet and
online service providers is illusory).
38. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971.
39. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004).
40. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971 (deciding that if the petitioner asserted a core claim in
his petition, then his petition would not have been dismissed); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443 (deciding
that if the petitioner asserted a non-core claim, his petition would not have been dismissed).
41. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779–80 (2008) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 319 (1995)).
42. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971; Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443.
43. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971. Cf. Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 573
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Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the
circumstances. . . . Habeas ‘is, at its core, an equitable remedy’ . . . .
Habeas is not ‘a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has
grown to achieve its grand purpose’ . . . . [T]he common-law habeas
court’s role was most extensive in cases of pretrial and noncriminal
detention, where there had been little or no previous judicial review of
the cause for detention.44

In Rasul v. Bush, the Court quoted to INS v. St. Cyr to say: “‘[a]t its historical
core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
been strongest.’”45 Furthermore, in Reno v. Flores, Justice O’Connor asserted that immigrant children have a “core” constitutional “interest in freedom from institutional confinement.”46 Even the conservative majority in
Flores took for granted the capacity for immigrant children to file habeas
petitions to enforce the Flores Settlement in their favor.47
Thuraissigiam cited to several “core” habeas cases where immigrants
were released into the country,48 and it used a core/non-core distinction to
dismiss the writ.49 Thuraissigiam emphasized, however, that it is still the
immigrant’s choice of whether or not to assert appropriate habeas relief.50
Thuraissigiam did not unsettle Boumediene’s statement that the actual core

(2000) [hereinafter Freedman, Milestones] (explaining why habeas attorneys should not be fooled
by “Cheshire cat[s] guarding the jailhouse door,” that leave “a lingering grin that survives to disorient today’s travelers in the woods of doctrine”).
44. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779–80 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 319; Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).
45. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001)).
46. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315–16 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 340, 346
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (maintaining that any incarceration of a child, even under the settlement,
was an unconstitutional “deprivation of core constitutional rights”).
47. Id. at 314. But see Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29435 (June 20, 2018), revoked
by Exec. Order No. 14,011, 86 Fed. Reg. 8273 (Feb. 2, 2021).
48. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973.
49. Id. at 1971 (dismissing a non-core request for relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction);
see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004) (dismissing a core request for relief for lack of
jurisdiction), abrogated by Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796 (citing Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ky.,
410 U.S. 484, 499 n.15 (1973)) (refusing to dismiss on similar grounds, and rather, providing direction to the government to “move for change of venue”); cf. Joshua J. Schroeder, The Dark Side
of Due Process: Part I, A Hard Look at Penumbral Rights and Cost/Benefit Balancing Tests, 53
ST. MARY’S L.J. 323, 339 (2022) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Dark] (explaining how “Justice
Holmes put cognitive dissonance to work by focusing on extremes to define what Holmes called
the penumbra between them—law versus fact, procedure versus substance, day versus night”).
50. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973.
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of habeas is flexibility.51 However, as the “core” metaphor can be twisted to
make a rigid and inflexible dismissal, it may be a risk with no upside to keep
using the words “core” or “non-core” in habeas petitions.52

II. State that Prudential Barriers do not Legitimately Exist in
Habeas Corpus Cases
Thuraissigiam denied subject matter jurisdiction in a similar procedural
ruling to Rumsfeld v. Padilla.53 Both Thuraissigiam and Padilla cited to the
core of habeas to note a formality that should be followed when writing habeas petitions.54 Both cases relied upon prudential bases for denying jurisdiction, such as “serv[ing] the important purpose of preventing forum shopping by habeas petitioners.”55
Immigrant habeas courts tend to revert to prudential grounds in habeas
cases, sometimes dismissing the writ on bases routine in other branches of
law.56 However, as noted by Boumediene, prudential dismissal for incorrectly drafted habeas petitions is not necessary or required.57 Not only was
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 supposed to preclude dismissals for such

51. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779–80, distinguished by Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1981; id.
at 1963 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746) (preserving and extending Boumediene’s flexible
interpretation derived from the time ‘when the Constitution was drafted and ratified’”).
52. See cases cited supra note 40.
53. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971 (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for
not naming the correct form of relief in the original petition); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443 (dismissing
for lack of jurisdiction for not naming the correct custodian in the original petition).
54. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971 (noting that failure to assert core habeas relief can result
in dismissal); Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443–44 (noting that after Braden, a formal basis for dismissal
discussed in the case only applies “to core habeas challenges”).
55. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 447; see Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (dismissing a writ that
might upset the system “Congress provided by statute” using plenary power doctrine as a sort of
nonjusticiable political question rationale); id. at 1992 (Thomas, J., concurring) (defending the “efficacy of process prescribed by law”).
56. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (requiring exhaustion
to file habeas corpus); cf. Shinn v. Martinez, No. 20–1009, slip op. at 9–10 (2022) (citing federalism
concerns as the basis of prudential dismissal under bases like exhaustion doctrine).
57. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443, abrogated by Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796 (citing Braden v.
30th Jud. Cir. Ct. Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 499 n.15 (1973) (stating that the principle Padilla applied was
non-controlling)) (refusing to dismiss on similar grounds, and rather, providing direction to the
government to “move for change of venue”).
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formalisms generally,58 but the writ itself is resistant to rigid formalism for
two main reasons.59
First, centuries of English common law defined the writ as inherently
flexible and not held in by rigid forms.60 Second, the founders purposely
included the flexible common law writ into their system of government with
a mandate that Congress enact it in such a way that it is never suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion.61 Thus, not only the common law,
but the positive law must include a non-formalistic open door to the courts
to hear habeas writs.62
Padilla was abrogated by Boumediene presumably for this reason, directing the government to move for a change of venue rather than moving
for dismissal.63 The abrogation was obviously not clear enough to stop
Thuraissigiam and several lower courts from moving forward on similar
grounds.64 Thus, when faced with judges who may be overly concerned with
prudentially preserving judicial resources, restricting the practice of forum
shopping, and strictly adhering to habeas petition formalities, it may be
worthwhile to remind the court of its prudential “virtually unflagging obligation” to assert jurisdiction.65

58. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”); see Dioguardi v.
Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (“here is another instance of judicial haste which in the
long run makes waste”); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (“Perhaps the case that best
represents the access-minded and merit-oriented ethos at the heart of the original Federal Rules is
Dioguardi v. Durning.”); Joshua J. Schroeder, Leviathan Goes to Washington: How to Assert the
Separation of Powers in Defense of Future Generations, 15 FLA. A&M U.L. REV. 1, 86, 197–98
(2021) [hereinafter Schroeder, Leviathan].
59. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779–80 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995);
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).
60. Id.; see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131–33; ERIC M. FREEDMAN,
MAKING HABEAS WORK 3 (2018) (“The constitutional importance of the writ of habeas corpus is
in its function, not its name.”); see also DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1971–72 (2021)
(citing several such cases that arose from English common law).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779–80.
62. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) (applying “the habeas statute to persons detained
at the base” in Guantanamo Bay). See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 64 (1866) (noting the duty of
the judiciary to “sit with open doors”); id. at 121 (giving what is known as the open court ruling,
that “laws and usages of war . . . can never be applied [to suspend habeas corpus] . . . where the
courts are open and their process unobstructed”); see also Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114,
132 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“As long as courts are open and functioning, judicial review
is not expendable.”).
63. See cases cited supra note 57.
64. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 796, distinguished by Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1981
(“Boumediene, is not about immigration at all”).
65. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (asserting that the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them”).

250

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 49:3

Strictly speaking, prudence cannot properly preclude habeas review.66
Even staunch legalists who maintain an expansive concept of prudential selfrestraint to respect the laws, must also respect the Suspension Clause, which
is itself a law.67 As such, the Boumediene Court decided that the U.S. Judiciary’s power extends to foreign lands all around the world to vindicate the
fundamental human rights of non-citizen aliens, to extend to them release
pending legitimate process.68
The Boumediene Court remarked not once, but numerous times, that
“prudential concerns . . . are not relevant here.”69 Specifically, Boumediene
denied the legitimacy of Rex v. Cowle’s feudalism on prudential grounds.70
Cowle was a pre-Revolutionary War decision by Lord Mansfield that
blocked English habeas from running to Scotland (and America) based upon
a pretended geographic limitation to the English common law and the Rights
of Englishmen embodied by the Magna Carta.71 In fact, John Adams lambasted Cowle prior to the American Revolution as an illegitimate, feudal denial of civil rights to any British citizen living (or imprisoned) outside the
borders of England, including in America.72
It was, therefore, disheartening that in 2021 the American Samoan citizenship case Fitisemanu v. United States was reversed on a bare prudential
ground similar to Cowle.73 Judge Tymkovich decided in a short concurrence,
66. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751 (“prudential barriers . . . are not relevant here”); id. at 793
(“federalism concerns . . . are not relevant here”); id. at 795 (“[habeas petitioners] need not exhaust
the review procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding with their habeas actions in the
District Court”—“Our holding with regard to exhaustion should not be read to imply that a habeas
court should intervene the moment an enemy combatant steps foot in a territory where the writ
runs. The Executive is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine a detainee’s status before
a court entertains that detainee’s habeas corpus petition.”).
67. Id.; Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 817; see, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923), extended by Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–303 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (listing around 36 habeas cases that applied de novo review beginning
with Moore v. Dempsey, which was written by Justice Holmes who was a strict majoritarian legalist).
68. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751 (“The prudential barriers that may have prevented the English courts from issuing the writ to Scotland and Hanover are not relevant here.”), distinguishing
Rex v. Cowle (1759) 2 Burr. 834, 854–56 (Eng.).
69. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 793–95.
70. Id. at 751 (distinguishing Cowle, 2 Burr. at 854–56 (Eng.)).
71. Id. Cowle was reaffirmed on the brink of the American Revolution in Campbell v. Hall
(1774) 1 Cowp. 206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.) to deny all civil rights to the American Colonists.
72. Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay (Apr. 10,
1775) (citing Cowle, 2 Burr. at 835 (Eng.)) (exposing Cowle as illegitimate feudal law, according
to which the king of England established the union of Scotland, Ireland, and Wales by holding them
to the “imperial crown” while not respecting their independent systems of law, and while not annexing them to “the realm” for the purpose of securing their independent rights).
73. Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 883 (10th Cir. 2021) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
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“either party’s reading of the Citizenship Clause is plausible, so I resolve the
tie in favor of the historical practice.”74 Judge Tymkovich appeared to think
it would be prudent that a long, historical practice of ignoring the U.S. Constitution in U.S. territories should continue even though the historical practice he extended was premised on Downes v. Bidwell, a 1901 decision that
expressly stated its rationale was strictly temporary.75
Usually, prudence requires the Court to follow the jurisdictional limitations given by Congress, but in our tradition symbolized by Marbury v. Madison, wherever a law of Congress conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, the
statute must be overruled.76 The Marbury Court thus overruled a part of the
Judiciary Act with the iconic statement, “It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”77 Therefore, whenever a jurisdiction-stripping provision violates the Suspension Clause (or any
other part of the U.S. Constitution) the court must declare it unconstitutional
as Boumediene demonstrated (citing to Marbury).78
The Boumediene Court also considered applying the prudential doctrine
of exhaustion and stated, “These qualifications no longer pertain here.”79
Despite Boumediene’s firm prohibition on prudential barriers like exhaustion, the Ninth Circuit continued developing exhaustion doctrine tests for
habeas review in the context of immigration law.80 A good immigration attorney in habeas court will look for ways to effectively reveal the irony of
the Ninth Circuit continuing to apply prudential rules to suspend habeas corpus after Boumediene—for prudence would not counsel a judge to defy the
U.S. Constitution or stare decisis.81
74. Id.; cf. R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult
[2008] UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.), aff’g, Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp.
206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.) (citing to Cowle and denying the rights of the Englishman to any person
outside the borders of England, including the colonists in America).
75. Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 883 (Tymkovich, J., concurring), extending Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (explaining that Congress would only hold territories as territories “for a
time, that ultimately our own theories may be carried out and the blessings of a free government
under the Constitution extended to them”). Cf. U.S. Territories: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO broadcast Mar. 8, 2015) (emphasizing the irony of extending Downes today, when
Downes was decided over a century ago and emphasized that its holding would be temporary).
76. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803))
(overruling 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) and stating that to do otherwise would allow “a regime in which
Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is’”).
77. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
78. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
79. Id. at 794–95.
80. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017); cf. Shinn v. Martinez,
No. 20–1009, slip op. at 9–10 (2022) (citing federalism concerns as the basis of prudential dismissal
under exhaustion doctrine).
81. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 793–95. See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103,
2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
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The Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) final order rule cannot
apply to writs of habeas corpus, because writs of habeas corpus are not appeals under the law.82 Any law that requires judges reviewing habeas writs
to presume the legitimacy of the government as a mere appellate court unconstitutionally defeats the purpose of habeas and would be a suspension of
the writ on its face.83 The Boumediene holding strongly confirmed that habeas corpus cannot be replaced by mere appellate review,
[A habeas court] must have the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the earlier
proceeding. . . . Here that opportunity is constitutionally required.84

Habeas corpus is, thus, collateral rather than appellate, meaning that it comes
in from outside the law to confirm the legitimacy of government detentions,
and its scope is sweeping.85 It does not presume the legitimacy of any part
of the government proceedings it opens review upon—anything less than a
healthy suspicion of the government proceedings collaterally reviewed
(characterized by a full de novo review) is an unconstitutional suspension of
the writ.86

U.S. 833, 853 (1992). But see Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021)
(calling Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908) into question); id. at 2498 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the court did not “enjoin a flagrantly unconstitutional law”); Second Amendment Preservation Act, 2021 Mo. HB 85, § 1.430 (enacted) (challenging the enforceability of federal gun laws).
82. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 786 (noting that prudential limitations need not apply, and
that unlike in appeals, exculpatory evidence not presented previously may be reviewed to determine
the legality of the detention); see Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070–71 (2020) (discussing the final order rule). But see Castro v. USDHS, 835 F.3d 422, 450 (3d Cir. 2016).
83. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
84. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 786. But see Shinn, No. 20–1009, slip op. at 9–10.
85. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 141 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (“Habeas corpus ‘comes in
from the outside,’ after regular proceedings formally defined by law have ended, ‘not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may have been preserved, opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell.’”).
86. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771; Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) (“the claim is reviewed de novo”); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (“We shall not say more concerning
the corrective process afforded to the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to allow
a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of examining the facts for himself when, if true as
alleged, they make the trial absolutely void.”). Cf. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–303 (1992)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“To this list of cases cited by Justice Thomas, one
could add the following, all of which applied a standard of de novo review.” Listing around 36
cases given by Justices Thomas and O’Connor that applied de novo review beginning with Moore
v. Dempsey.).
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Habeas jurisdiction depends solely upon the fact of detention of a person by or under the color of the United States.87 It is issued on the custodian
according to the jurisdiction of the government over the custodian (not the
petitioner), so it is jurisdictionally irrelevant if the government tries to detain
an immigrant outside the borders of the United States.88 Habeas corpus is
not necessarily a review of the petitioner’s underlying case, but it must review the government’s legitimate authority to detain or imprison the petitioner de novo.89
The lack of a final ruling from EOIR or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) cannot preclude habeas corpus review of the legitimacy of
immigrant detention.90 In recent federal history, the courts have decided that
the finality of criminal verdicts in state court is enough to deny habeas review.91 Unless the court wants to delegitimize itself as entirely absurd, it
should not dismiss habeas review for lack of exhaustion in one case and because of exhaustion in another.92
The Boumediene Court’s prohibition of prudential barriers to review
ultimately comes from Ex parte Milligan, a Civil War era ruling.93 The Milligan Court emphasized the narrow scope of the only two valid exceptions
87. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14 (enacting broad language so that habeas corpus
may be issued to inquire the legitimacy of detaining any person “in custody, under or by colour of
the authority of the United States”).
88. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745–46 (quoting In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, 439–40 (Cooley,
J., concurring)) (“‘The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this
[habeas] writ is, that it is directed to, and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailer.’”);
Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 395 (1973) (“the language of § 2241(a) requires
nothing more than the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian”), overruling
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (using geography to deny habeas corpus to German immigrants disappeared onto Ellis Island); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304–07 (1944) (stating that
habeas corpus jurisdiction is served and “made effective, if a respondent who has custody of the
prisoner is within reach of the court’s process, even though the prisoner has been removed from the
district since the suit was begun”).
89. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21–23 (1955); Moore, 261 U.S. at
92 (requiring de novo review).
90. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 793–95 (prohibiting exhaustion doctrine in the habeas context). Cf. Dimitri D. Portnoi, Resorting to Extraordinary Writs: How the All Writs Act Rises to Fill
the Gaps in the Rights of Enemy Combatants, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 294–95 (2008).
91. See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 267 (2015); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75
(2003); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478 (1991); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475–76 n.7,
491 n.31 (1976).
92. Compare Stone, 428 U.S. at 475–76 n.7, 491 n.31 (citing Bator, supra note 28, at 473, and
n.75) (emphasizing “the necessity of finality in criminal trials” to deny federal habeas review of
state court convictions), and Castro, 835 F.3d, at 450 (emphasizing the finality of EOIR for a certain class of immigrants through plenary power doctrine), with Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d
976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (requiring exhaustion in EOIR to file habeas corpus); but see Shinn v.
Martinez, No. 20–1009, slip op. at 9–10 (2022) (seamlessly emphasizing the court’s purported interests in finality and exhaustion as if they were not a complete and total contradiction in terms).
93. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 793–95 (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866)).
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to the Suspension Clause expressly included within the Clause itself, rebellions and invasions.94 The Milligan Court found, and the Boumediene Court
reiterated, that standing for habeas review must be granted unless an actual
rebellion or invasion physically overwhelms the court.95
Habeas standing can only be revoked by the court if there is a rebellion
or invasion involving actual violence that temporarily shutters the actual
doors of the court.96 The Legislative and Executive branches are unable to
legitimately suspend federal standing to hear writs of habeas corpus when
the courts remain unimpeded by actual violence created by rebels or foreign
enemy soldiers.97 The Suspension Clause stands for the idea that no amount
of jurisdiction-stripping legislation can stop the courts from properly hearing
the Great Writ on behalf of immigrants—even after Thuraissigiam.98
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam was a
breathtaking abuse of the Court’s doctrines of judicial prudence.99 Thuraissigiam’s dismissal was primarily premised on the grounds of an erroneously
drafted habeas petition.100 Thus, the Court may have prudently implied a
properly drafted petition under the Civil Rules as in Dioguardi v. Durning,
where an Italian immigrant’s nearly illegible complaint sufficed to maintain
federal jurisdiction.101
Thuraissigiam was secondarily premised upon the political branches’
plenary power.102 Thuraissigiam named plenary powers for prudential support in the way the Court sometimes cites to non-justiciable political question

94. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (“The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real,
such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”).
95. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 793–95 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127).
96. Id. Cf. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121.
97. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 793–95 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See DHS. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963, 1968
(2020) (noting that the reason habeas was denied was not a narrow interpretation of Boumediene,
but the erroneous way the petition was written, meaning that if it was written correctly the case
may have proceeded); id. at 1993, 2015 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s decision
not to hear habeas corpus writs for an entire class of immigrants in this case was “a self-imposed
injury on the Judiciary,” implying that it was not imposed or imposable on the court by congressional law). See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020); Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No.
17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *62–63, *72 (S.D. Cal. 2021). Cf. Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 541 (1832) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 25) (setting a man
free who was put in jail for opposing Georgia’s theft of the Cherokee Nation’s land), extended by
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2477 (2020). But see Thoung v. United States, 913 F.3d 999,
1003–04 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing The Real ID Act, 119 Stat. 302–323, § 106).
99. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1963, 1968; id. at 1993, 2015 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1968 (“His petition made no mention of release from custody.”).
101. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
102. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982–83.
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doctrine.103 The general prudential nature of plenary power doctrine may be
demonstrated by comparing Miller v. Albright and District of Columbia v.
Heller, where Justice Scalia first espoused and then rejected “the plenary
power of Congress.”104
The divergence of Miller and Heller, especially highlighted by Scalia’s
opinions, suggests that the application of plenary power ideology is a matter
of each judge’s conscience, i.e., a doctrine of judicial prudence.105 It may,
therefore, be helpful to note that Thuraissigiam’s pretext of plenary powers
was imprudent for two reasons: (1) plenary powers were used as a pretext to
answer a question not answered by the courts below;106 and (2) the Court did
not name a law from the political branches that suspended the writ, nor did
it consider whether there was an invasion or rebellion to justify a suspension,
even though this was the central issue briefed to the court.107
For where an area of the United States is actually attacked, as happened
in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor was bombed, a temporary suspension may lie—
but only while actual violence still exists.108 Thus, wherever a civil court
remains open, even amidst the current COVID-19 crisis or a president’s
threats to institute martial law in response to the untimely death of George
Floyd and other police murders around the country, no suspension of the writ

103. Id. at 1981 n.26 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)); Fong
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708 (following “the rules that prudence dictates” to assert plenary power
doctrine) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Cornelia T. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Skeptical Scrutiny Of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v.
Albright, 1 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12, 34–35 (1998).
104. Compare Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 441 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion),
id. at 445 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (naming prudential reasons to dismiss the for
lack of jurisdiction), and id. at 457 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (naming “the plenary
power of Congress” as a further reason to defer to Congress rather than draw its laws under constitutional scrutiny), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (denying Congress’ “plenary authority to exclude” gun rights), id. at 619 (quoting to “‘prudent selfdefense’” as reason to overrule a federal law under the U.S. Constitution), and id. at 669–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 24 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting)) (naming
Congress’ “plenary” power over state militias).
105. See cases cited supra note 104.
106. Compare Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1983 (purporting to decide the extent of the Due
Process Clause in immigration suits), with Thuraissigiam v. USDHS, 917 F.3d 1097, 1111–12 (9th
Cir. 2019) (distinguishing and not addressing due process claims), and id. at 1119 (“we do not
profess to decide in this opinion what right or rights Thuraissigiam may vindicate via use of the
writ”).
107. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1972, 1982–83 (“the legality of his detention is not in
question,” because petitioner did not request release in his petition). Cf. Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra
note 103, at 34–35.
108. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324, 324–35 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866)).
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is valid.109 Habeas corpus standing must remain, including for the purpose
of reviewing whether detaining people in prisons is constitutional during
health crises and over the previous president’s threats of martial law.110

III. Assert the Habeas Corpus Standard of De Novo Review of
Law and Fact
Despite the reasons given in Part I above that EOIR is not a civil court,
federal judges may treat EOIR, or even the expedited deportation process of
ICE and CBP, as a civil court to disregard and dismiss immigrant habeas
petitions.111 For example, in Thuraissigiam the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that the process given in a credible fear interview at a stage prior to even
entering EOIR is enough process to satisfy the Due Process Clause.112 The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s use of the Castro Court’s socalled two-step inquiry, and stated that “Boumediene [was] taken entirely out
of context.”113
As disagreeable as the decision in Thuraissigiam may be, its reversal of
the Ninth Circuit application of the Castro two-step inquiry offers a useful
reset for Boumediene-based review.114 The Thuraissigiam Court distinguished Boumediene, requiring cases like Castro to dismiss prior to rendering an interpretation on Boumediene, as Castro attempted.115 This presents

109. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,751, 793–95 (2008) (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127);
Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324 (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25); id. at 324–35 (Murphy, J., concurring) (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127). Cf. Jorge Loweree et al., The Impact of COVID-19 on Noncitizens and Across the U.S. Immigration System, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 27, 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/impact-covid-19-us-immigration-system.
110. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 751, 793–95 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127); Duncan, 327 U.S.
at 324 (quoting Milligan, 71 U.S. at 124–25); id. at 324–35 (Murphy, J., concurring) (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127).
111. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1964 (treating DHS officers in ICE, CBP, and USCIS that
conduct credible fear interviews as a civil court, by holding that this is satisfactory “due” process).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1975–83 (distinguishing the plenary power cases of the eugenics era and
Boumediene); id. at 2013 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s ruling presumably
“applies to—and only to—individuals found within 25 feet of the border who have entered within
the past 24 hours of their apprehension”). Compare Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d, at 1112, 1115 (citing
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–13 (1953)), with Castro v. USDHS,
835 F.3d 422, 438–43 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 214). But see INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001).
114. Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d at 1106–08, 1112 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739) (applying
Castro’s “two-step approach,” stating “in accordance with Boumediene, we evaluate Thuraissigiam’s Suspension Clause challenge in two steps”), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. at 1981 (distinguishing
Boumediene). See, e.g., Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
167128, at *58 (S.D. Cal. 2021).
115. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1981–82 (dismissing for deficient petition rather than interpreting Boumediene).
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an opportunity to apply the holdings of Boumediene anew, without regard to
Castro’s two-step inquiry.116
The main distinction between Castro and Boumediene was that
Boumediene required habeas courts to focus on the status of the custodian to
establish jurisdiction, instead of focusing on the status of the prisoner.117 As
emphasized in Part I above, several cases applied Boumediene’s jurisdictional focus on the custodian rather than the prisoner to find that in cases of
executive detention habeas corpus review is at its strongest.118 Furthermore,
the standard of this review is de novo, meaning “fresh review” and is the
strongest form of review available in federal court.119
In other words, habeas common law requires federal judges not to trust
the reasonableness of lower courts or government agencies that they are
called upon to collaterally review.120 This is so because trusting these tribunals, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently did in Thuraissigiam, makes a farce
out of habeas corpus.121 This behavior, justified by plenary power in the
immigration context, creates an opportunity to “elevate[] ‘might makes

116. See Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 13, at 47–49 (presenting Boumediene’s six key
holdings).
117. Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745–46 (applying the ordinary custodian rule for jurisdiction), with Castro, 835 F.3d at 446 (not applying the ordinary custodian rule, and rather focusing on petitioner’s immigration status to decide jurisdiction).
118. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783; Hensley v. Mun. Ct., San Jose-Milpitas Jud. Dist. Santa
Clara Cnty., 411 U.S. 345, 345, 351 (1973); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238–39, 243–44
(1963), extending Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304–07 (1944) (speaking of the end of habeas
corpus: “That end may be served, and the decree of the court made effective, if a respondent who
has custody of the prisoner is within reach of the court’s process, even though the prisoner has been
removed from the district since the suit was begun.”); Simon, supra note 10, at 482; see supra note
88 and accompanying text; cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35 (2004). But see Castro,
835 F.3d at 444–45.
119. What is DE NOVO?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/de-novo/ (last
visited Aug. 25, 2021); see Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) (not applying the “deferential
standard that applies” under statutory language, but rather “the claim is reviewed de novo”); see
also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299–303 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780–81, 786; supra note 85. See, e.g., Cone, 556 U.S. at 472
(habeas corpus “is reviewed de novo”). Cf. Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020).
121. supra note 86; DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 2015 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“In the face of these policy choices, the role of the Judiciary is minimal, yet crucial: to
ensure that laws passed by Congress are consistent with the limits of the Constitution.”). See, e.g.,
Thoung v. United States, 913 F.3d 999, 1003–04 (10th Cir. 2019). Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
404–05 (1963) (quoting Bushell’s Case (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Eng.)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984) (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983))
(making a “farce and mockery” out of a court case is a reversible structural error).

258

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

Vol. 49:3

right’ to the status of judicial doctrine,”122 while falsely maintaining that immigrants still potentially have access to habeas review.123
It is not hyperbole to acknowledge that de novo review traditionally
marks out the line between feudalism and common law.124 The conflict between the common law writ and its old adversary feudalism loomed large, as
Prince Andrew boldly asked a U.S. district court to withhold de novo review
of Virginia Giuffre’s federal tort claims.125 The impious prince implicitly
asserted the feudal case Rex v. Cowle to suggest that national borders must
limit Giuffre’s common law rights in America,126 which is the same qualitative claim King George III made regarding American rights before he lost
England’s oldest crown colonies in the revolution of 1776.127

122. Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human Rights in the Name
of Sovereignty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1115, 1135–36, 1175 (2002); cf. Joshua J. Schroeder, The
Body Snatchers: How the Writ of Habeas Corpus was Taken from the People of the United States,
35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 18–26 (2016) [hereinafter Schroeder, The Body] (noting the development
of feudal law maxim “the King can do no wrong” in America and its effect on habeas cases).
123. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the plurality opinion a “sham,” which is a synonym for farce); see also Dahlia Lithwick, Nevermind:
Hamdi Wasn’t So Bad after All, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2004, 5:37 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/09/hamdi-wasn-t-so-bad-after-all.html [hereinafter Lithwick, Nevermind] (explaining
how Hamdi appeared to be one thing, but then became “precisely the opposite”).
124. Cone, 556 U.S. at 472 (habeas corpus “is reviewed de novo”); see Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 237 n.10 (1940) (citing the proper authorities from English common law); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16–17 n.9 (1955) (citing THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776)). Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 748 (asserting de novo
review rather than the English feudal case Rex v. Cowle, which would have required deference),
with R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Bancoult [2008]
UKHL 61, ¶¶ 32, 36, 81–84, 87, 125, 146–49 (Eng.) (affirming Campbell v. Hall (1774) 1 Cowp.
206, 208, 211–12 (Eng.)).
125. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP
12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to FRCP 12(e) at 20, Giuffre
v. Prince Andrew, No. 1:21-cv-6702 (2021) (Doc. 34) (“Giuffre’s salacious allegations regarding
abuse that purportedly occurred outside the State of New York and/or outside the United States
altogether are wholly irrelevant and may not be considered by this Court”); Giuffre v. Andrew, No.
21-cv-6702, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6659, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (denying Prince Andrew’s motion to dismiss “in all respects”).
126. See sources cited supra note 125; Letter from Novanglus to the Inhabitants of the Colony
of Massachusetts Bay (Apr. 10, 1775) (citing Rex v. Cowle (1759) 2 Burr. 834, 835 (Eng.)) (explaining that limiting rights at national borders as was done in Cowle is an application of feudalism
inappropriate for American legal practice); cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950);
Calvin’s Case [1608] 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 18a, 27a (Eng.) (the idea that a natural born citizen could
disclaim their right to protection in the courts of their own nation just by residing in a foreign
country should be considered as Lord Coke decided “less than a Dream of a Shadow, or a Shadow
of a Dream”); Lemmon v. New York, 20 N.Y. 562, 605–06 (1860) (citing Somerset v. Stewart
[1772] 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (Eng.)). But see Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 13, at 67 (citing
USAID v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082, 2086–87 (2020)).
127. Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 13, at 69–70 n.80; United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 654 (1898) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1) (declaring jurisdiction over
natural born citizens); id. at 658–59 (citing Calvin’s Case [1608] 7 Co. Rep. 1a (Eng.)); JAMES
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Rather than securing the rights of all immigrants, including American
expatriates like Giuffre, through criminal extradition of their oppressors under the compact of 1776,128 President Biden is focused on tamping down on
the immigration of innocent asylum seekers.129 So far, in support of his
agenda, President Biden: (1) re-operationalized Trump’s Migrant Protection

OTIS, COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 16 (Richard Samuelson ed., 2015) (quoting Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of New-England Charters 23 [1765] (“[T]o complete the oppression, when they [the Americans] upon their trial claimed the privileges of Englishmen, they were
scoffingly told, those things would not follow them to the ends of the earth. Unnatural insult; must
the brave adventurer who with the hazard of his life and fortune, seeks out new climates to enrich
his mother country be denied those common rights, which his countrymen enjoy at home in ease
and indolence? . . . Monstrous absurdity! Horrid inverted order!”)); see, e.g., Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 120 (1804) (“The American citizen who goes into a foreign country . . . is
yet . . . entitled to the protection of our government, and if . . . he should be oppressed unjustly, he
would have a right to claim that protection, and the interposition of the American government in
his favor would be considered a justifiable interposition.”).
128. Lee Brown, Prince Andrew Faces ‘Disaster’ No matter How He Responds to Sex Accuser’s Suit, Experts Say, N.Y. POST (Aug. 10, 2021, 4:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2021/08/10/prince-andrew-faces-disaster-no-matter-how-he-responds-to-sex-accuserslawsuit/ (explaining that “Prince Andrew cannot be extradited to answer sex accuser Virginia Roberts Giuffre’s damning lawsuit”); Schroeder, Conservative, supra note 13, at 58 n.36, 63 n.51 (addressing extradition law as the earliest version of immigration law in America). Cf. Ex parte
Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (1840), extending Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.).
129. See, e.g., Philip Marcelo & Gerald Hebert, Immigrant Detentions Soar Despite Biden’s
Campaign Promises, AP NEWS (Aug. 5, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-health-immigration-coronavirus-pandemic-4d7427ff67d586a77487b7efec58e74d; Uriel J. García, The Number
of Undocumented Immigrants in Detention Centers has Increased by More than 50% Since Biden
Took Office, TEX. TRIBUNE (Dec. 2, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/12/02/joe-biden-ice-immigration-detention/.
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Protocols (“MPP”),130 (2) extended Trump’s Title 42 immigrant expulsions,131 (3) rejected making appropriate settlements with migrant children

130. Texas v. Biden, 554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 857–58 (N.D. Tex. 2021), application for stay denied, 142 S. Ct. 926 (2021) (citing DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S Ct. 1891 (2020));
Press Release, RAICES Condemns Biden Administration’s Plan to Re-Operationalize MPP,
RAICES (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.raicestexas.org/2021/09/16/raices-condemns-biden-adminplan-mpp/; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a president has the power to choose his own policies even if they exist
in “a zone of twilight” where “the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority,” or even when “his power is at its lowest ebb” where “the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress”); id. at 614 (emphasizing judicial
restraint by citing to the Jay Court’s rejection of President Washington’s request for an advisory
statement that allowed Washington to maintain his Proclamation of Neutrality despite a heated
political debate led by Hamilton for and Madison against regarding its legality); see Biden v. Texas,
No. 21–954, slip op. at 5 (2022) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s initial failure to stay the Fifth
Circuit’s injunction despite the law’s extreme lack of clarity regarding its apparent support for the
MPP, and the law’s apparent conflicts with the MPP raised by the Ninth Circuit in Innovation Law
Lab v. Nielsen); id. at 25 (allowing Biden to issue a rescission of the MPP, but only after Biden
extended Title 42 and other complex administrative rules as alternate bases to force asylum seekers
to stay in Mexico); id. at 3 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the MPP was initially enjoined by
the Ninth Circuit as unlawful, but the U.S. Supreme Court stayed that injunction, allowing the MPP
to continue during the Trump years). Cf. William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow
Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 6–7 (2015) (discussing the moment the legal community
became broadly aware of the shadow docket and coining the term “shadow docket”); Joshua J.
Schroeder, America’s Written Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say What the Law
Is, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 833, 882–84 n.295 (2015) [hereinafter Schroeder, America’s] (also responding to the Wheaton College injunction as an example of a misuse of equity, because the shadow
docket is merely what the equity docket is called when equity is being misused, like the new “Chancellor’s foot”).
131. Andrea Castillo, Appellate Court Allows Biden Administration to Keep Expelling Families
Under Health Law for Now, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-09-30/appellate-court-oks-biden-administration-to-keep-expelling-families-underhealth-law; Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, No. 21-100, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175980, at *60–62
(D.D.C. 2021) (granting preliminary injunction), stay granted slip op. No. 21-5200, at 1 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 30, 2021) (granting a stay at the request of the Biden administration). When Biden attempted
to phase out Title 42 with more nuanced rules that would also likely allow for DHS to keep people
out of the country for similar reasons as Title 42, a federal court in Louisiana issued a nationwide
temporary restraining order to keep the Trump Title 42 order in place while it decides whether to
issue a preliminary injunction. Arizona v. CDC, No. 6:22-cv-00885, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80434,
at *23–26 (W.D. La. 2022).
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separated by the Trump administration,132 (4) failed to reform ICE’s dangerous and inhumane flight policies,133 (5) continued Trump’s black site immigration courts,134 and (6) adopted rules to allow DHS asylum officers to fully
adjudicate asylum claims outside of EOIR.135 The last of these developments
may subject asylum seekers to a process every bit as unjust and inquisitorial
as a royal Star Chamber to administer “deportation[s]—‘the equivalent of
banishment or exile.’”136
In a time when immigration enforcement was not the biggest controversy facing habeas corpus review, the Warren Court applied the ordinary de
novo standard of review in Fay v. Noia to review state criminal incarceration.137 After a conservative majority overruled Fay in piecemeal fashion,138
the de novo standard was applied again in Boumediene,139 and the apparent
controversy over the proper habeas standard was expressly settled, again, in
favor of de novo review in Cone v. Bell.140 Nevertheless, the movement to
overrule Fay by inventing alternative deferential, judge-made standards of
132. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Rejects $450,000 Payments for Separated Migrants, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/us/politics/biden-rejects-paymentsmigrants.html.
133. Angelika Albaladejo, A Drunk Mechanic, Shackled Immigrants, a Crash Landing: the
Dangers of ICE Flights, CAPITAL & MAIN (Nov. 4, 2021), https://capitalandmain.com/a-drunkmechanic-shackled-immigrants-a-crash-landing-the-dangers-of-ice-flights, featured on Rose
Aguilar, Media Roundtable: The History of Dangerous Incidents on US Chartered Immigration
Detention
Flights,
KALW:
YOUR
CALL
(Nov.
18,
2021,
11:27
PM),
https://www.kalw.org/show/your-call/2021-11-18/media-roundtable-the-history-of-dangerous-incidents-on.
134. Arvind Dilawar, The Trump Administration’s Cruelty Haunts Our Virtual Immigration
Courts, IN THESE TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021), https://inthesetimes.com/article/virtual-courts-immigration-asylum-seekers-immigration-court; see Andrew Cohen, Biden’s New Immigration Judges Are
More of the Same, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 10, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/bidens-new-immigration-judges-are-more-same.
135. Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of
Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18078 (effective May 31,
2022).
136. Id.; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947)). See Anker, supra note 20, 495–96 (noting the inquisitorial style of
EOIR); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 n.10 (1940) (noting that protection from an inquisitorial style Star Chamber was central to the purposes of the writ of habeas corpus embodied by the
Suspension Clause). Cf. Nicole Narea, Biden’s Immigration Policy Isn’t Trump’s—But It’s Still a
Disappointment, VOX (Aug. 4, 2021, 12:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/8/4/22605595/biden-immigration-border-title-42-deportation-mexico.
137. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404 (1963) (quoting Bushell’s Case [1670] 124 ER 1006
(Eng.)) (opening de novo review of state criminal incarceration cases); id. at 423 (citing Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 348 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); id. at 427.
138. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 303
(1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
139. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at
348 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
140. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) (“Instead, the claim is reviewed de novo.”).
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review, left a trail of federalism jurisprudence through the last half of the
Twentieth Century that applied something other than de novo review to federal habeas cases involving state criminal trials.141
Most attempts to judicially rejigger the ordinary de novo standard occurred prior to the first major jurisdiction-stripping enactment for immigrants since the eugenics era,142 which was the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),143 a sister statute of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).144
Not only is federalism irrelevant when considering whether to hear habeas
writs to review federal executive detentions of foreign nationals,145 but it is
worthwhile to remember that Crowell v. Benson’s invocation of de novo review, which became the foundation of all administrative law in the United
States as we know it,146 was inspired by immigrant habeas suits that are now
over a century old.147 Now that immigration enforcement took center stage
in the 2020 habeas court, attorneys should cite to Crowell’s strong invocation
of de novo habeas corpus review of law and fact that was originally drawn
by Crowell from Ng Fung Ho and Liu Hop Fong to resist deportation.148

141. See., e.g., Shinn v. Martinez, No. 20–1009, slip op. at 9–10 (2022) (attempting to bridge
this jurisprudence in the context of an AEDPA proceeding); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 327
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 643 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Cf. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296–98 (2001) (noting that due to the law as it existed prior
to IIRIRA, “in the period between 1989 and 1995 alone, § 212(c) relief was granted to over 10,000
aliens”). See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 (1993).
143. IIRIRA, 110 Stat. 3009.
144. AEDPA, 110 Stat. 1214.
145. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (“federalism concerns . . . are not
relevant here”).
146. See Pfander, supra note 36, at 659–62, n.62 (noting “the significance of Crowell to the
modern administrative state” consisted in “the widespread reliance on Crowell in crafting rules to
govern the judicial review of agency action”). Cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 506 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60–61 (1932) (citing Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284–85 (1922) (citing Liu Hop Fong v. United States, 209 U.S. 453, 461 (1908) (“the law
contemplates that he shall be given the right of a hearing de novo before the district judge before
he is ordered to be deported”))). Cf. Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive
Detention at Guatánamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 580–82 n.277 (2010); Pfander, supra note 36,
at 659–62, n.62.
148. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 60–61 (citing Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 283–84 (“[T]he proceeding
for deportation is judicial in its nature. . . . [O]n appeal to the District Court additional evidence
may be introduced and the trial is de novo. . . . The situation bears some resemblance to [military
service cases.] . . . It is well settled that, in such a case, a writ of habeas corpus will issue to determine the status.”) (citing Liu Hop Fong, 209 U.S. at 461 (“In our view, giving the Chinaman an
appeal, the law contemplates that he shall be given the right of a hearing de novo before the district
judge before he is ordered to be deported.”))) (“We are of the opinion that the District Court did
not err in permitting a trial de novo on the issue of employment.”).
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The Crowell Court proceeded to require Article III de novo review
wherever “fundamental rights depend” in the style of a habeas writ: “When
proceedings are taken against a person under the military law, and enlistment
is denied, the issue has been tried and determined de novo upon habeas corpus,” and therefore, “the District Court did not err in permitting a trial de
novo on the issue of employment.”149 This holding should be strongly cited
by immigration attorneys to refute any attempt by the government to use
Chevron,150 Brand X,151 or Auer152 to ask the Court to dismiss habeas corpus
without reviewing the facts, because doing so would amount to “the untenable assumption that the constitutional courts may be deprived in all cases of
the determination of facts upon evidence even though a constitutional right
may be involved.”153
This liberal de novo review of fact and law, as it related to administrative adjudication, was required by Crowell as a caveat to the legitimacy of
all administrative adjudications thereafter.154 Without it, Crowell may require the delegitimization of the entire administrative state.155 For Crowell
implied a right of final de novo review into all congressional enabling acts
in order to avoid litigating difficult, politically controversial questions of
constitutionality.156
Unfortunately, the Crowell decision was recently undermined in the immigration context by Jennings v. Rodriguez.157 The Jennings Court cited to
Crowell’s invocation of constitutional avoidance doctrine, but then failed to

149. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 58. Cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923).
150. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (prescribing judicial deference to
agency constructions of the law where Congress was “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue”).
151. Nat’l Cable & Telecoms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(“Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute”).
152. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997) (deferring to agency interpretations of their
own regulations where they are ambiguous, and noting that the executive department “is free to
write the regulations as broadly as [it] wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute”).
153. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 60–61. But see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018)
(citing to Crowell for constitutional avoidance doctrine, but not actually taking care to avoid a
statutory construction that may directly conflict with the Suspension Clause).
154. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57–59; Stern, 564 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See Mulligan,
supra note 147, at 580–82.
155. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57–59; Stern, 564 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Moore, 261
U.S. at 92. See Mulligan, supra note 147, at 580–82.
156. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57–59 (“fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law”). See Mulligan, supra
note 147, at 580–82.
157. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62) (citing to constitutional avoidance doctrine, and explicitly not adopting a statutory construction designed to avoid direct conflict
with the constitution).
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adopt a statutory construction that avoids direct conflicts with the constitution.158 Jennings expressly refused to decide whether the statute violated due
process even after it was briefed on the issue (a violation of Marbury’s requirement to say what the law is),159 but it did not modify Crowell’s de novo
review requirement in any way.160 Thus, several district courts across the
United States ignored Jennings’ statutory treatment to keep extending habeas
corpus to unjustly incarcerated immigrants.161

IV. Ask the Federal Court to Administer the Common Law
Habeas Remedy
The ancient, common law remedy of habeas corpus is release pending
a legitimate trial.162 The first significant habeas corpus case decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court granted this remedy to benefit an immigrant named Erick Bollman to resist a deportation ordered by then President Thomas Jefferson.163 Bollman was released into the United States (not deported back to
his native Germany), a representation of Boumediene’s 1789 minimum of

158. Id. Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. at 62;
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 345–48 (1936)); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727
(2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)) (requiring the Court to “say ‘what
the law is’”).
159. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 852 (refusing to “resolve respondents’ Due Process Clause
claims”); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. See Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018); cf.
Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, No. 19–896, slip op. at 9 (2022) (taken to its logical end, Jennings
only delayed the Court’s eventual constitutional decision, which may go against Justice Alito’s
intentions for Jennings); Biden v. Texas, No. 21–954, slip op. at 9 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(noting that Alito does not see Jennings the same way as the rest of the court).
160. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 (only citing to Crowell for constitutional avoidance doctrine,
a federal constitutional principle that originated long before Crowell); cf. Murray v. The Charming
Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (expressing a similar kind of avoidance doctrine that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains” in order to imply international rights into a statute).
161. See, e.g., Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019) (applying
a six factor test to decide whether due process was violated); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp.
3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (adopting the Jamal test); Djelassi v. ICE Field Office Director,
434 F. Supp. 3d 917, 929 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (adopting the Jamal test). But see DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1983 (2020) (possibly foreclosing Jamal tests when it decided “the Due
Process Clause provides nothing more [than the rights Congress’ statutes grant], it does not require
review” of asylum applications in the habeas context).
162. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969–70. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 136 (1807) (discharging an immigrant named Erick Bollman)) (“where imprisonment is unlawful, the court ‘can only
direct [the prisoner] to be discharged’”).
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habeas release that belied Thuraissigiam’s conflation of habeas release with
its opposite—incarceration.164
The habeas common law remedy is the best-case scenario and should
almost always be requested, because if it is granted its beneficiary will need
no bond or any other process prior to release.165 In an apparent attempt to
ward immigration attorneys away from ever requesting this type of basic habeas relief, Thuraissigiam suggested that requesting common law habeas release may be the same as asking to be deported by the government.166 Specifically, the Thuraissigiam Court wrote:
While respondent does not claim an entitlement to release, the Government is happy to release him—provided the release occurs in the
cabin of a plane bound for Sri Lanka.167

Here, the Court seemed to forget Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where the Court’s remand under Mathews v. Eldridge, rather than ordering Hamdi’s release, allowed the government to strip him of his U.S. citizenship, deport him, and
put him on a no fly list.168 If not seeking release can result in what happened
in Hamdi, then there is nothing more to fear from seeking release.169 Like

164. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973 (implying that it would not be a complete oxymoron to
grant a habeas writ to order a petitioner’s “release into the custody” of a foreign captor); id. at 20–
21 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting Bollman, 8 U.S. at 136). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 404–05 (1963) (quoting Bushell’s Case [1670] 124 ER 1006 (Eng.)). See also Ex parte
Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (1840), extending Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.).
166. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973. The strange fiction that the Court used to draw a connection between deportation and release was the idea that immigrants who enter into the United
States never actually entered into the United States, i.e., the Court believes it is dealing with people
“detained prior to entry,” or “detained at entry,” and that their physical presence within the United
States is not real and that using habeas corpus to release immigrants into the country would somehow make their entry real in some sense, even though the government already forcefully detained
them within the United States, sometimes for indefinite periods of time. Id. at 1979–81. The reality
of immigrant presence and its legal relevance for constitutional purposes is and has always been
separate from the issue of legal entry, as commemorated by the census. See DOC v. New York,
139 S. Ct. 2551, 2561–62 (2019) (noting that the constitution requires the census to count the “total
population” of the states, including all immigrants whether or not they have a legal status and regardless of how they entered the United States).
167. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973.
168. Id.; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)); Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123.
169. Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539 (plurality opinion) (“the
case is remanded for further proceedings”).
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the plurality opinion in Hamdi, Thuraissigiam relied upon a Mathews v. Eldridge balancing case to suggest that such a deportation might occur.170
Then, similar to the ultimate end of Hamdi, a deportation did occur that may
cause “almost certain death for Thuraissigiam and others like him.”171
Thuraissigiam misrepresented Justice Story’s opinion in Ex parte D’Olivera,172 a case that arose during the War of 1812—a war that was waged
against England’s extradition system so that immigrants could freely move
to the United States.173 The Court does not want immigration attorneys looking back into the history it misrepresented in Thuraissigiam, especially into
the works of Joseph Story, because Story supported the fundamental legitimacy of immigrant habeas corpus petitions as summarized in his Commentaries here,
[T]he writ of habeas corpus . . . is, therefore, justly esteemed the great
bulwark of personal liberty; since it is the appropriate remedy to ascertain, whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not, and the
cause of his confinement; and if no sufficient ground of detention appears, the party is entitled to his immediate discharge. The writ is most
beneficially construed; and is applied to every case of illegal restraint,
whatever it may be; for every restraint upon a man’s liberty is, in the
eye of the law, an imprisonment, wherever may be the place, or whatever may be the manner, in which the restraint is effected.174

The Court attempted to manifest its own bias under the name of Joseph Story,
assuming nobody would fact-check what Justice Story actually thought.175

170. Compare Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32
(1982) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35)), with Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion)
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
171. Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Doesn’t See Asylum-Seekers
as People, SLATE (June 25, 2020, 3:35 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/06/supremecourt-asylum-deportations-thuraissigiam.html; Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123. See Sarah
Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence [hereinafter Stillman, When].
172. Compare Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970 (citing Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 3,967) (Opinion of Story, J.)), with Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480
n.11 (2004) (citing D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. at 854 (Opinion of Story, J.)).
173. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812, PART I, at 32–33 (1900) (explaining the pro-immigration purposes of the War of 1812). Cf. United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 711 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
174. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1333.
See also Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (Story concurred
in this opinion that resulted in release of an immigrant into the United States), extended in Ex parte
Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (1840).
175. Compare Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970 (citing Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 3,967) (Opinion of Story, J.)), with JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON

December 2022

A CANDLE IN THE LABYRINTH

267

The Court’s strained use of D’Olivera was especially confusing, because it
could have easily cited Story’s anti-common law denial of habeas jurisdiction in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, a pro-slavery decision.176 If the common law
remedy of Somerset’s Case, Bollman, Holmes v. Jennison, and The Amistad
was roundly affirmed today, then immigrants granted habeas corpus would
be immediately released into the United States and the burden of justifying
a new detention (if any) would be borne by the government.177
The common law at work in Bollman and The Amistad was fully expounded in Holmes v. Jennison, where a murder suspect by the name of
George Holmes escaped from Canada to Vermont.178 Canada had no extradition treaty with the United States, but the Governor of Vermont nevertheless arrested Holmes at the behest of Canadian authorities and ordered
Holmes to be delivered to “William Brown, the agent of Canada . . . to the
end that he, the said George Holmes, may be thence conveyed to the said
District of Quebec and be there dealt with . . . .”179
Holmes filed a writ of habeas corpus, which ping-ponged between the
Vermont and U.S. Supreme Courts and was ultimately decided in Holmes’s
favor, because Vermont was powerless to make its own extradition treaty

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1333. But see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539,
611–12 (1842) (distinguishing Somerset’s Case and denying habeas corpus).
176. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 541 (repeating and extending the limitations established by Somerset’s
Case that “the state of slavery” does not arise from the common law, but must come from positive
laws, or arise “as a matter of comity, and not as a matter of international right,” i.e., “The state of
slavery is deemed to be a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of the
territorial laws.”); id. at 619–20 (citing to “the ordinary exigencies of the National Government”
under plenary power doctrine to set aside the common law protections of habeas corpus); Joshua J.
Schroeder, We Will All Be Free or None Will Be: Why Federal Power is Not Plenary, But Limited
and Supreme, 27 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 46 (2021) [hereinafter Schroeder, We Will] (“Prigg v.
Pennsylvania was the first use of [plenary power] ideology to endorse the federal government’s
power to exclude immigrants and shut down immigration between the states.”).
177. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 747 (2008) (citing Somerset’s Case (1772) 20 How.
St. Tr. 1, 80–82 (Eng.) (releasing an enslaved African individual into England as a free person
under the common law, because he was imported into a free nation governed by the common law))
(“We know that at common law a petitioner’s status as an alien was not a categorical bar to habeas
corpus relief.”); id. at 779 (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 136 (1807) (discharging an immigrant named Erick Bollman into the United States)); United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518,
596 (1841) (finding that “there does not seem to us to be any ground for doubt, that these negroes
ought to be deemed free,” but after they were freed into the United States, they had to raise money
to pay for their own travel back to Africa); Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (1840), extending
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.); JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1333, 1895; but see Prigg, 41
U.S. at 541 (using the Fugitive Slaves Clause as evidence of a plenary power exception from the
ordinary common law practice of releasing prisoners unjustly detained including former slaves).
178. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 540–41.
179. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
THE
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with Canada.180 In the absence of a valid extradition treaty, the common law
habeas remedy exemplified by Somerset’s Case was applied to release
Holmes, an immigrant suspected of murder, into the United States.181 In The
Amistad Justice Story extended the rationale in Holmes to deny a Spanish
queen her human prey wherever the law of extradition did not support the
royal enforcement of slavery.182 Habeas release into the United States remains the underlying common law that counteracts claims of feudal slavery
and imperialism that might otherwise threaten to supplant the U.S. constitutional system of separated and federal powers.183
Ignoring this, Thuraissigiam based its decision upon a historical misrepresentation when it stated: “As late as 1816, the word ‘deportation’ apparently ‘was not to be found in any English dictionary.’”184 But it appears
that in the case of Ex parte Bollman, the word “deportation” was used synonymously with the term “extradition” by President Thomas Jefferson himself.185 Privately, Jefferson admitted that his “military arrest and deportation” orders issued against Bollman were all illegal and that a wide door was
opened to immigrants by both federal and state laws at the time.186
The Boumediene Court noted that unqualified release is the ordinary
habeas remedy, but stressed that the writ of habeas corpus is an adaptable

180. Id. at 582 (Opinion of Thompson, J.) (noting that absent an inherent, constitutionally
vested Article II power of extradition, the power “exists nowhere, there being no treaty or law on
the subject”); Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (1840).
181. Holmes, 39 U.S. at 561 (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (interpreting the lack of an extradition
treaty as reason for the State of Vermont to release an immigrant fleeing criminal prosecution into
the United States through habeas corpus), extended in Holmes, 12 Vt. at 641–42.
182. The Amistad, 40 U.S. at 552–53, 596 (“We deny that Ruiz and Montez, Spanish subjects,
had a right to call on any officer or Court of the United States to use the force of the government
or the process of the law for the purpose of again enslaving those who have thus escaped from
foreign slavery, and sought an asylum here.” Agreeing with and extending Holmes by saying, “there
does not seem to us to be any ground for doubt that these negroes ought to be deemed free, and that
the Spanish treaty interposes no obstacle to the just assertion of their rights.”), quoting and extending Holmes, 39 U.S. at 569 (Opinion of Taney, C.J.).
183. The Amistad, 40 U.S. at 552–53, 596. See, e.g., Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 58, at
214 (explaining a possible use of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Holmes to resolve a contemporary issue of international law).
184. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1973 (2021).
185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Wilkinson (Feb. 3, 1807); Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to William C.C. Claiborne (Feb. 3, 1807).
186. See sources cited supra note 185; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Flower (Sept.
12, 1817) (hoping “to consecrate a sanctuary for those whom the misrule of Europe may compel to
seek happiness in other climes”); cf. Letter from George Washington to Francis Adrian Van der
Kemp (May 28, 1788) (“I had always hoped that this land might become a safe & agreeable Asylum
to the virtuous & persecuted part of mankind, to whatever nation they might belong . . . .”); Collet
v. Collet, 2 U.S. 294, 296 (C.C.D. Pa. 1792).
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writ and that federal courts can require something different.187 This is reflected in the open-ended definition of “in custody” that was given by both
English and American courts to extend habeas jurisdiction over matters involving, for example, African people claimed by white enslavers as property,
Japanese American citizens held in internment camps, wives illegally constrained by their husbands, children left by their parents to Christian reformatories in the Dominican Republic, individuals awaiting trial but released on
their own recognizance, state prisoners released on parole, immigrants held
in detention facilities, and any person who is or may be wrongfully deported.188 In such cases, the Court may issue the writ in order to apply something more than the basic common law remedy.189
However, habeas corpus would be “a sham” if its liberal adaptability
was used to require something less than release pending legitimate government action.190 Using the liberal nature of the Great Writ to make a habeas
remedy more austere and inflexible than the ancient common law remedy
would be a misuse of the writ that delegitimizes not only the legislative and
executive branches, but the judiciary as well.191 For the U.S. government’s
actual interest lies in the protection of human rights, according to the Declaration of Independence.192
187. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,779 (2008) (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 136
(1807) (immediately discharging an immigrant named Erick Bollman)).
188. Id. at 747 (citing Somerset v. Stewart [1772] 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (Eng.)); Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283, 304–07 (1944); Rex v. Clarkson [1722] 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (KB); KIDNAPPED FOR
CHRIST (Red Thorn Productions 2014); Hensley v. Mun. Ct., San Jose-Milpitas Jud. Dist. Santa
Clara Cnty., 411 U.S. 345, 345, 351 (1973); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238–39, 243–44
(1963) (citing Endo, 323 U.S. at 304–07); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010); Rivera
v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
But see Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1979.
189. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (“Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an
adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the circumstance.”).
See FREEDMAN, supra note 60, at 14, 16–17, 23–24, 31.
190. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Thuraissigiam,
140 S. Ct. at 1970; Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 561 (1840) (Opinion of Taney, C.J.) (interpreting the lack of an extradition treaty as reason for the State of Vermont to release an immigrant
fleeing criminal prosecution into the United States through habeas corpus), extended in Ex parte
Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 641–42 (1840).
191. Cf. Thuraissigiam v. USDHS, 917 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 779) (noting that habeas corpus is “‘an adaptable remedy’” in order to grant something
far less than what habeas corpus under Boumediene requires), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). The
reversed Ninth Circuit decision applied an era of eugenics-based case law that fell short of the scope
of power granted under the writ as it was applied in 1789 as Castro (not Boumediene) suggested it
should. See id.
192. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 9, 14, 31 (U.S. 1776) (blaming the king
of England for “obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners” and for “render[ing] the
Military independent and superior to the Civil Power”); see ARGUMENT OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS,
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES,
APPELLANTS, VS. CINQUE, AND OTHERS, AFRICANS, CAPTURED IN THE SCHOONER AMISTAD BY
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Despite the recent development of U.S. government black sites across
the world and an unchecked torture program, the feudal punishment of infidels and aliens continues to be precluded by the Title of Nobility Clause
(a.k.a. the Emoluments Clause), as well as the First Amendment.193 The
Declaration of Independence requires our Courts to bow to the majesty of
every human being in the world—for every person is a citizen of the place
they were born and rightly holds a share of sovereignty in the place that they
came from, as the people of the United States do in America.194 It is thus
upon the government’s respect for human rights as a matter of the sovereign
dignity of people (rather than borders or military defense) that its legitimacy
rests.195
Nevertheless, it is commonplace for immigration lawyers to ask for less
than the habeas remedy of release pending legitimate due process.196 Immigration attorneys tend to make deals with ICE and EOIR on behalf of their

LIEUT. GEDNEY 82 (1841). Cf. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Draught of a Fundamental Constitution for
the Commonwealth of Virginia, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 220 (William Peden ed.,
1996) (“The benefits of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall be extended, by the legislature, to every
person within this state, and without fee, . . . . The military shall be subordinate to the civil
power.”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 124–25, 127–28 (1866) (quoting paragraph 14 of the Declaration of Independence as reason to find that “[m]artial rule can never exist where the courts are
open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction”).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2, 8; id. amend. I; see supra note 183 and accompanying text;
Jamie Raskin, What’s Trump’s idea of ‘America First’? G-7 cash flowing to his golf resort., WASH.
POST (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/28/whats-trumps-ideaamerica-first-g-cash-flowing-his-golf-resort/ (discussing how the Emoluments Clause was intended to “sweep away the corruption inherent in monarchy and feudalism”). Cf. JOHN ADAMS,
THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 22 (2000) (emphasizing the American rejection
of “the canon and feudal law,” and noting that the separation of church and state depended upon
this rejection); id. at 94; Zande, supra note 20, at 335 (“the Star Chamber was subject to direct rule
by” the king); United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 524 (1841) (denying the queen of Spain’s
petition for the return of her slaves).
194. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419, 454 (1793) (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl); id. at 470–71 (Opinion of Jay,
C.J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl). Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 93 (1990); Amy H.
Kastely, Cicero’s De Legibus: Law and Talking Justly Toward a Just Community, 3 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 15 (1991) (citing Cicero, De Legibus 2.2.5) (discussing the contributions Cicero made
to our legal thought regarding natural citizenship versus legal citizenship); Acts 25:1–22.
195. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 157
(“The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the common law.”); U.S. CONST. pmbl; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); OTIS,
supra note 127, at 126 (“[I]t is left to every man as he comes of age to chuse [sic] what society he
will continue to belong to.”); Cicero, De Legibus 2.2.5 (noting that every person has natural citizenship wherever they were born).
196. See, e.g., Castro v. USDHS, 835 F.3d 422, 437 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Petitioners contend that
the finality-era [i.e., eugenics era] cases ‘establishe[d] a constitutional floor for judicial review’
Pet’rs’ Br. 26 . . . .”); Brief for Respondent at 29, 45, DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019)
(mem.) (No. 19-161).
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clients, navigating a system known for granting “shadow wins.”197 A 2021
study by Tulane University Law School’s Immigration Rights Clinic indicated that these shadow wins are actually part of a wider government strategy
to maximize immigrant detention, and minimize the chances an immigrant
will succeed in habeas court.198
However, post-Thuraissigiam there are even stronger reasons to reconsider applying for habeas relief under post-Jennings balancing tests to pressure an agency for a shadow win.199 Asking for more process in EOIR rather
than release is now apparently prohibited by Thuraissigiam, which cited to
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi as an example of a case that attempted to
remand a remedy less than release.200 Justice Scalia’s dissent aptly characterized the absurdity of the resulting system in terms that could be applied to
EOIR,
Having found a congressional authorization for detention of citizens
where none clearly exists; and having discarded the categorical procedural protection of the Suspension Clause; the plurality then proceeds,
under the guise of the Due Process Clause, to prescribe what procedural protections it thinks appropriate. It ‘weigh[s] the private interest
. . . against the Government’s asserted interest,’ . . . and—just as
though writing a new Constitution—comes up with an unheard-of system in which the citizen rather than the Government bears the burden
197. See Dara Lind, “Shadow Wins”: How ICE Avoids Judicial Accountability by Quietly Releasing Immigrants Who Challenge Being Detained, PROPUBLICA (May 25, 2021, 11:50 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/shadow-wins-how-ice-avoids-judicial-accountability-by-quietly-releasing-immigrants-who-challenge-being-detained.
198. Id.; TULANE IMMIGRATION RIGHTS CLINIC, NO END IN SIGHT: PROLONGED AND
PUNITIVE IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN LOUISIANA 13–15, 24–27 (2021) (“a shadow win . . . ends
the litigation without a formal ruling on the legality of the detention”). Granting shadow wins is
seen by illiberal immigration reformers as a necessary stop-gap until the United States can perfect
the immigration system by presumably replacing IJs with computer algorithms and investing in
more beds at detention facilities to host potentially every immigrant that crosses into the United
States. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN 7–10, 131
(2020) (drawing their central principle of administrative law from Wong Yang Sung, an immigrant
habeas case); Jason Blakely, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s Technocractic Despotism, THE
CHRONICLE (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/cass-sunstein-and-adrian-vermeules-technocratic-despotism?cid2=gen_login_refresh&cid=gen_sign_in (issuing a warning
about Sunstein & Vermeule); DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., NOISE 6–7, 334, 377 (2021) (citing to a
study entitled Refugee Roulette about the arbitrariness of American immigration adjudication in
order to justify arguments about perfecting the system with computer algorithms “either to replace
human judgment or to supplement it” instead of dismantling the immigration system as arbitrary
and capricious); id. at 340–41 (prescribing of system of fairness without mercy, because “mercy is
noisy”).
199. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1970 (2020); id. at 1978 (citing Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 563 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality
opinion) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (remanding a balancing test to a
military tribunal).
200. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1978; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of proof, testimony is by hearsay rather than live witnesses, and the
presiding officer may well be a ‘neutral’ military officer rather than a
judge and jury. . . . It claims authority to engage in this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a
case involving . . . the withdrawal of disability benefits! Whatever the
merits of this technique when newly recognized property rights are at
issue (and even there they are questionable), it has no place where the
Constitution and the common law already supply an answer.201

According to the Hamdi plurality opinion, a military tribunal could theoretically apply common law due process, and thus instead of releasing Hamdi
pending a public treason trial the Court remanded a novel balancing test for
the military tribunal to apply.202 The Hamdi test was ironically hailed by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer as the more liberal and therefore better approach.203 It was venerated by most liberals at that time as their most favored
of the three original 9/11 sister cases.204
But it was not to be, because the Hamdi balancing test was never administered by a military tribunal.205 The military ignored the U.S. Supreme
Court, stripped Hamdi of his U.S. citizenship, deported him to Saudi Arabia,
and put him on a no-fly list.206 The decision hailed as most liberal was revealed as the most draconian, and “[w]ith a yawn and a shrug, the [Bush]
administration . . . eras[ed] the episode from our national memory.”207

201. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis and ellipses in original).
202. Id. at 529 (plurality opinion); id. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 529 (plurality opinion joined by Justice Breyer); id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring
in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (joining “the plurality in a judgment of the Court vacating the Fourth
Circuit’s judgment and remanding the case” with “qualifications,” because “the plurality . . . order[ed] remand on terms closest to those I would impose” and listing the liberal rights that Hamdi
should be given including right to counsel, notice of charges, and “a fair chance to rebut it before
a neutral decisionmaker”).
204. See, e.g., Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123 (noting the general feeling in America in
2004 was that “Hamdi’s case . . . was supposed to represent a high-water mark for American freedoms during wartime”); Mark Joseph Stern, Stephen Breyer Is Worried About the Forever War’s
Permanent Prisoners. He’s 15 Years Too Late., SLATE (June 10, 2019, 4:31 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/stephen-breyer-aumf-dissent-gitmo-scotus.html (“In
2004, Justice Stephen Breyer cast the decisive vote in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, allowing the government
to detain alleged terrorists indefinitely without trial.”).
205. Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (to
subject a U.S. citizen “to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people” is a cruel and
unusual punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment).
206. Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123.
207. Id.
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Hamdi was gutted by Boumediene only a few years after its creation.208
Boumediene expressly overruled the jurisdiction-stripping provision that replaced and superseded a provision that the Hamdi decision arose directly
under.209 If Hamdi is raised by the Government, an immigration attorney
should note that its decision rested upon a law superseded by Congress and
finally overruled by Boumediene.210
Post-Jennings balancing tests that may require bond hearings to be administered by IJs are similar to Hamdi and therefore suspect.211 Another
possibility left open by Jennings that immigration attorneys should explore
is overruling INA for violating due process by being void for vagueness.212
It is possible to succeed in this way over the Jennings decision because that
is how Boumediene dealt with Hamdi for misconstruing the underlying law
that Congress later confirmed by amendment was intended to strip its jurisdiction.213
The argument for overruling INA as void for vagueness, rather than applying a balancing test, can be put another way: (1) nearly all federal district
judges agree that a law that allows indefinite detention of immigrants without
bond hearings violates due process of the law;214 (2) Jennings expressly construed INA to allow the indefinite detention of immigrants without bond
hearings;215 and (3) the only logical conclusion to be made from premises (1)

208. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (arising under the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) of 2001, 115 Stat. 224), superseded by statute, Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005,
119 Stat. 3474; Military Commission Act (MCA) of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600, as recognized in Hamad
v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 996–98 (9th Cir. 2013); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008)
(“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” (citing
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting))). Cf. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1028–29
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
209. See sources cited supra note 208.
210. See sources cited supra note 208.
211. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lithwick, Nevermind, supra note 123.
212. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2018) (quoting Jordan v. De George,
341 U.S. 223, 229, 231 (1951) (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))). Cf.
United States v. Cortez-Ruiz, 225 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1105 (2016).
213. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784 (distinguishing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538) (“Setting aside the
fact that the relevant language in Hamdi did not garner a majority of the Court, it does not control
the matter at hand. None of the parties in Hamdi argued there had been a suspension of the writ.
Nor could they. The § 2241 habeas corpus process remained in place.”).
214. Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2019); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 874 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104–469, pt. 1,
p. 123, and n. 25 (1996)) (“Congress did not consider the problem of long-term detention. It wrote
the statute with brief detention in mind.” Congress cited that “the ‘average stay [was] 28 days.’”).
215. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 (“we hold that there is no justification for any procedural
requirements that the Court of Appeals layered onto § 1226(a) without any arguable statutory foundation”).
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and (2) is that the entire law pertaining to the detention of immigrants violates due process and must be declared unconstitutional and void.216

V. Explain How EOIR Structurally Fails to Secure Common
Law Due Process
Most immigration attorneys spend their days in the Executive Branch,
appearing in administrative proceedings that style themselves as “courts.”217
An immigration attorney should not be afraid to describe these tribunals as
coram non judice in habeas court by explaining each and every structural
defect of EOIR, ICE, and CBP.218 In the criminal context, structural errors
(like failing to empanel a jury or letting in evidence that violates the Fourth
Amendment) are grounds for a habeas court to set aside a guilty verdict and
set the imprisoned individual free.219
Deportation (now called “removal”) was considered on more than one
occasion by the U.S. Supreme Court to be a drastic, medieval punishment
known in previous eras as banishment.220 It is absurd and grotesque that this
punishment is doled out in the immigration context on a mass scale without
adhering to basic due process requirements like empaneling a jury and holding a common law trial before an impartial decision maker.221 It is a violation
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause protections of “any person”

216. Id. at 852; Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727 (requiring the Court to “say ‘what the law
is’”) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177). Cf. Schroeder, America’s, supra note 130, at 884.
217. Department of Justice, EOIR: About the Office, DOJ WEBSITE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last visited May 8, 2022) (“EOIR interprets and administers federal immigration laws by conducting immigration court proceedings.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).
218. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 209 (1830) (explaining how non-civil, executive branch
administered tribunals can lose their “high ground” and become like “a court martial”), extended
by Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782; see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57–59 (1932); DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1995 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1393–94 (2020); McGirt v. Oklahoma,
140 S. Ct. 2452, 2480 (2020); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000) (Opinion of Stevens, J.); but see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976) (applying a cost/benefit balancing
test to avoid structural error analysis).
220. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1213
(2018) (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229, 231 (1951) (quoting Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (quoting Delgadillo
v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1947) (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945))).
221. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1789) (Opinion of Chase, J.) (holding that Congress does
not have the power to enact “a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause”). See Anker, supra
note 20, 495–96; see also Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18078
(effective May 31, 2022). But see Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1965 (deferring to EOIR, ICE, and
CBP as if they were legitimate civil tribunals).
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to hold immigration court for the singular purpose of treating immigrants
different from U.S. citizens in the administration of due process.222
Immigration attorneys should, therefore, argue consistently and continually that EOIR fails to meet the structural requirements of a tribunal that
administers due process.223 The attributes that EOIR lacks are comparable
to those described in the fiery Scalia dissent in Hamdi quoted above,224 have
other historical parallels in the now-abolished Star Chamber and Privy Council Courts of England (referred to in Chambers v. Florida),225 and the illegitimate administrative tribunal declared unconstitutional and void by Lord
Coke in Dr. Bonham’s Case.226 Specifically, EOIR structurally fails to secure common law due process for the following reasons:
(1) its lack of a jury;
(2) its lack of adversarial process;
(3) its lack of an impartial decision maker;
(4) its lack of rules of evidence (prohibition of hearsay, etc.);
(5) its lack of warrant requirement;
(6) the fact that no independent judge decides who, where, how long, and
in what manner immigrants are detained (things that the warrant requirement is supposed to ensure); and
(7) INA’s allowance of the indefinite detention of immigrants.

This is a non-exhaustive list of structural errors that are part of EOIR’s regular administration and more may be apparent.227 Any one of these structural
222. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law”) (emphasis added); id. amend. XIV; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (“the
substantive guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374 (1886), protects persons as well as citizens”). Cf. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S Ct. 1891, 1917 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgement in
part, and dissenting in part). But see Sunday v. Attorney General United States of America, 832
F.3d 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2016).
223. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373; THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 9, 31 (U.S. 1776); OTIS, supra note 127, at 126 (“it is left to every man
as he comes of age to chuse [sic] what society he will continue to belong to”) (emphasis in original);
ROOSEVELT, supra note 173, at 32–33 (describing the pro-immigration reasons for the War of
1812). Cf. Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *62–
63 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (hearing immigration due process claims even after Thuraissigiam).
224. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575–76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 n.10 (1940) (citing the laws that form the basis
of habeas corpus in England, that abolished the Star Chamber, and inspired the ratification of the
Suspension Clause); Zande, supra note 20, at 335 (describing that the Star Chamber was directly
controlled by the executive branch).
226. Dr. Bonham’s Case [1610] 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 118a (Eng.) (Opinion of Lord Coke) (applying the maxim that no person shall be judge in their own cause (nemo judex in sua causa)); Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (no man shall be “judge in his own cause”).
227. James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht v. Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1130–35 (1994); see Weaver v. Massachusetts,
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errors could be enough for a federal court to overturn the guilty verdict of a
state court to set an incarcerated person free.228 Immigration lawyers may
still broadly push this argument; they do not need to let their clients be detained by judicial forums with these structural flaws without a strong argument against it.229
Structural error by definition is not a “harmless” error,230 and was originally inspired by the heightened standard of evidence given in Woodby v.
INS as extended in Chapman v. California.231 The Woodby decision named
the conceptual predecessors of structural error doctrine in denaturalization
cases and expatriation cases like Schneiderman v. United States, stating
“[n]o less a burden of proof is appropriate in deportation proceedings.”232
Nevertheless, Woodby, Schneiderman, and Chapman are all in danger of being overwrought by a strong feeling exacerbated during the Trump era that
immigration law is inherently political.233 This feeling essentially holds that
politicians like Donald Trump and Joe Biden are the disease, rather than only
a symptom of a bigger, structural problem.234
Throughout the Trump era and continuing into the Biden era, immigration attorneys generally hold out for political solutions and ask federal courts
for more process in EOIR—a politically controlled tribunal—but these requests are often denied.235 In Jennings, attorneys asked the Court to interpret
INA to imply a requirement for EOIR bond hearings in cases of prolonged
137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907–08 (2017); see also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966), extended by
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 n.10 (1967).
228. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1907–08; Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629–30 (1993).
229. See Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286 (“We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless
it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for
deportation are true.”), extended by Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 n.10 (establishing the structural error
doctrine).
230. See Liebman & Hertz, supra note 227, at 1130–35 (noting that “structural” error is synonymous with “harmful” error).
231. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285–86, extended by Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 n.10.
232. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285–86; see, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 160
(1943).
233. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, The Race to Dismantle Trump’s Immigration Policies, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/02/08/the-race-to-dismantletrumps-immigration-policies [hereinafter Stillman, The Race].
234. See, e.g., Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Donald Trump is Not the Problem – He’s the Symptom, OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/donald-trump-is-notproblem-he-s-symptom/. Cf. Matter of A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307, 308 (A.G. 2021) (“I vacate A-B- I
and A-B- II,” which is a good politically driven result for immigration attorneys, however this result
is temporary “pending rulemaking”); Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of
Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg.
18078 (effective May 31, 2022) (potentially accomplishing the same thing as the Matter of A-Bopinions only through rulemaking procedures).
235. See, e.g., DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1970 (2020); Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018); Castro v. USDHS, 835 F.3d 422, 450 (3d Cir. 2016).
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detention—this request was denied.236 Post-Jennings district courts around
the country developed due process balancing tests to decide whether to remand to EOIR to require these bond hearings directly under the Fifth
Amendment despite Jennings.237
In Castro and Thuraissigiam, attorneys asked for EOIR to pause the
expedited removal of asylum seekers to reconsider credible fear decisions.238
The Castro Court summarily denied the request and the Circuit Court decision in Thuraissigiam limited its grant of more EOIR review to the facts,
before being reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court for the attorney’s failure
to ask for the common law remedy.239 Neither of these cases ensured the
release of immigrants from imprisonment and nobody involved in the litigation of either case characterized the inquisition administered by EOIR, ICE,
and CBP as illegitimate coram non judice.240
Thuraissigiam interpreted a process conducted by biased enforcement
officers as “due” process and this decision may be put to the test by recently
adopted DHS and DOJ joint rules.241 However, President Trump was the
first to test out Thuraissigiam’s questionable due process analysis when he
occupied Portland, Oregon with BORTAC—militarized ICE and CBP
agents.242 Under his idea of presidential power, apparently supplied to him

236. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842.
237. See, e.g., Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019) (applying
a six-factor test to decide whether due process was violated); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp.
3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (adopting the Jamal test); Djelassi v. ICE Field Office Director,
434 F. Supp. 3d 917, 929 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (adopting the Jamal test). Cf. Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *62–63 (S.D. Cal. 2021).
238. Castro, 835 F.3d, at 450; Thuraissigiam v. USDHS, 917 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2019),
rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
239. Castro, 835 F.3d, at 450; Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d, at 1106, rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
240. Castro, 835 F.3d, at 450; Thuraissigiam, 917 F.3d, at 1106, rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
241. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1983 (determining that the immigrant was given the right to
a credible fear interview, and that “the Due Process Clause provides nothing more”); Procedures
for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT
Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg. 18078 (effective May 31, 2022).
242. Emily Green & Keegan Hamilton, Border Patrol Snipers Were Authorized to Use Deadly
Force at George Floyd’s Burial, VICE NEWS (Oct. 1, 2020, 8:34 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/5dz7zd/border-patrol-snipers-were-authorized-to-use-deadly-force-at-george-floyds-burial;
Ed Pilkington, ‘These are His People’: Inside the Elite Border Patrol Unit Trump Sent to Portland,
THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/jul/27/trump-border-patrol-troops-portland-bortac. See Jonathan Levinson et al., Federal Officers Use Unmarked Vehicles to Grab People in Portland, DHS Confirms, NPR (July 17,
2020, 1:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/17/892277592/federal-officers-use-unmarked-vehicles-to-grab-protesters-in-portland; see also Associated Press, Portland Protesters Clash with
Agents
Outside
ICE
Building,
KWQC
(Aug.
20,
2020,
9:19
AM),
https://www.kwqc.com/2020/08/20/portland-protesters-gather-at-federal-immigration-building.
Cf. Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (D. Or., 2020) (quoting Leigh
v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2012)).
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by the 2019 term’s immigration decisions, Trump began signing orders on a
variety of topics with the belief that they were then as binding as congressional law.243
A robust executive can cause the legal ground under an immigrant case
to shift quickly, so it is pivotal to remember how simple edits to habeas petitions can preserve a foreign national’s privilege to “seek to enforce separation-of-power principles” under Boumediene.244 As Judge Hardiman stated
in his Castro concurrence, which was quoted in Thuraissigiam, it was the
immigration attorney’s failure to request release pending legitimate process
that doomed their habeas petitions,
Unlike the petitioners in Boumediene—who sought their release in the
face of indefinite detention—Petitioners here seek to alter their status
in the United States in the hope of avoiding release to their homelands.
That prayer for relief, in my view, dooms the merits of their Suspension Clause argument . . . .245

The Thuraissigiam Court endorsed this logic by authoring a new requirement
of requesting “simple release,” while also appearing to suggest that such
“simple release” may include forcing a person to fly across the world in an
unsafe, minimally regulated charter flight “while their hands and ankles are
shackled”—an oxymoron of Orwellian proportions.246 If the Court granted
simple, immediate release into the United States by ruling ICE and EOIR
processes unlawful, as habeas common law may require, the law of nonrefoulement (‘non-return’) should apply.247

243. Transcript: ‘Fox News Sunday’ Interview with President Trump, FOX NEWS (July 19,
2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/transcript-fox-news-sunday-interview-withpresident-trump [hereinafter Transcript: ‘Fox] (citing DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891 (2020)) (statement of then President Trump: “The Supreme Court gave the president of
the United States powers that nobody thought the president had . . . . But the decision by the Supreme Court on DACA allows me to do things on immigration, on health care, on other things that
we’ve never done before.”). See, e.g., Building and Rebuilding Monuments to American Heroes,
Exec. Order 13,934, 85 Fed. Reg. 41165 (July 3, 2020); Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok,
Exec. Order 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48637 (Aug. 11, 2020); An America-First Healthcare Plan, Exec.
Order 13,951, 85 Fed. Reg. 62179 (Oct. 1, 2020). Cf. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183,
2203 (2020) (adopting unitary powers theory for the first time in a majority decision).
244. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008). See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1975
(distinguishing Boumediene as “out of context”).
245. Castro v. USDHS, 835 F.3d 422, 450–51 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, C.J., concurring dubitante), quoted by Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971. See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying
text (discussing the problems with defining deportation as a form of “release” in habeas cases).
246. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1971; Albaladejo, supra note 133.
247. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at pt. 1, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1984), S. Treaty Doc. 100–20 (1988) (“No
State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are
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The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), a multilateral treaty that sets forth the principle of unconditional
nonrefoulement.248 Thus, a habeas court may apply CAT to preclude return,
removal, extradition, or deportation in the absence of or pending legitimate
process by the government to properly review asylum claims.249 Moreover,
under existing law an immigrant asylum seeker may adjust their status regardless of where or how they first entered into the country.250
Critics of immigrant rights, including supporters of Trump’s draconian
immigration policies, maintain that border inspection is paramount to all legal travel to the United States.251 In other words, they are committed to
denying the existence of the law of nonrefoulement even if the courts began
to use it to invalidate EOIR and ICE processes to release immigrants into the
United States.252 Future presidents may seek to emulate Trump era policies
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”), implemented by Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), 112 Stat. 2681-761,
2681-822G, § 2242 (“It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the
person is physically present in the United States.”).
248. See sources cited supra note 247; see Trent Buatte, The Convention Against Torture and
Non-refoulement in U.S. Courts, 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 701, 710 (2021) (noting that the “bare minimum to meet CAT Article 3” is unconditional regarding an immigrant’s status, because unlike the
Refugee Convention “CAT requires no such nexus and contains no exceptions”).
249. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at pt. 1, art. 3 (Dec. 10, 1984), S. Treaty Doc. 100–20 (1988) (requiring the United States to determine all “substantial grounds” and “relevant considerations” before
denying CAT relief). If the United States did not allow for a process that determined all substantial
grounds and relevant conditions before deporting asylum seekers, it would be violating CAT.
FARRA, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822G, § 2242(b) (requiring the executive branch to “prescribe
regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3” of CAT); cf. Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2020) (deciding that provisions that would preclude the judicial
review of a final order of removal in habeas court “do not preclude judicial review of a noncitizen’s
factual challenges to a CAT order”).
250. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982; see Matter of N-V-G-, 28 I&N Dec. 380, 380–82 (BIA
2021) (noting how refugees, not yet admitted as lawful permanent residents, may adjust their status
possibly regardless of crimes or infractions previously committed). See also Innovation Law Lab
v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)).
251. Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *41–44
(S.D. Cal. 2021). See Memorandum from Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, Attorney General, on
Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1049751/download; see also Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census, 85 Fed. Reg. 44679 (July 21, 2020), cited by New
York v. Trump, 141 S. Ct. 530, 538 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (per curiam). Cf. Sanchez v.
Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (2021).
252. Innovation Law Lab, 951 F.3d at 988; Al Otro Lado, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at
*70. See Jane Chong, Donald Trump’s Strange and Dangerous ‘Absolute Rights’ Idea, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/president-trumpabsolute-rights/607168/ (noting that Trump “tweeted that he had ‘the absolute right’ to close the
border”). Cf. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a president who closes the border in violation of the
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that treated all undocumented immigrants as presumptively illegal, even
though many of them may legally adjust their status and eventually naturalize as proper U.S. citizens.253
As stated above, the remedy of release pending a trial was first granted
to an immigrant in Ex parte Bollman, i.e., release of an immigrant into the
United States, and affirmed in Boumediene as the ordinary common law minimum for all persons.254 Nevertheless, at the immigration attorneys’ express
requests in Jennings, Castro, and Thuraissigiam the Court only considered
remanding to EOIR for more process.255 These cases may, therefore, be considered distinguished from any case where an immigration attorney requests
the common law remedy.256

VI. Flip the Script of the So-Called Plenary Power Doctrine
In the immigration context, plenary power doctrine is “the political
branches’ plenary authority to exclude aliens.”257 It is judge-made law that
essentially grants the U.S. federal government sovereign immunity from
suits in federal court for any policy or law that involves policing U.S. national borders.258 It arose directly from the eugenic Chinese Exclusion Case,
a.k.a. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, which opened the floodgates to the

Hobbs Act would be committing an impeachable offense); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53,
65 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967)).
253. Monika Batra Kashyap, “Illegal” vs. “Undocumented”: A NWIRP Board Member’s Perspective, NW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS PROJECT, https://www.nwirp.org/illegal-vs-undocumented-anwirp-board-members-perspective/; Al Otro Lado, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *42 (distinguishing Thuraissigiam and not treating all immigrants that cross without inspection as presumptively “illegal”); see also Lindsey Romain, Why You Shouldn’t Use the Term “Illegals”, TEEN
VOGUE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/why-you-shouldnt-use-the-term-illegals. See, e.g., Report: The Trump Zero Tolerance Policy: A Cruel Approach with Humane and
Viable Alternatives, REFUGEES INT’L (July 31, 2018), https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/7/31/trump-zero-tolerance-policy (“The policy is in conflict with U.S. international obligations and U.S. policy . . . .”).
254. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75,
136 (1807) (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14 (still good law))). See also Thuraissigiam,
140 S. Ct. at 2002–04 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, The Judiciary Act of
1789 and the American Judicial Tradition, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990); Thuraissigiam v.
USDHS, 917 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2019).
255. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 747 (citing Somerset v. Stewart [1772] 98 ER 499 (Eng.)); Eric
M. Freedman, Dimension I: Habeas Corpus as a Common Law Writ, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
591, 600–05 (2011) [hereinafter Freedman, Dimension I] (confirming that non-white slaves benefited from the writ of habeas corpus before and after the American Revolution); Thuraissigiam, 140
S. Ct. at 1999–2001 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
256. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1973, distinguishing Somerset v. Stewart [1772] 98 ER 499
(Eng.).
257. Castro v. USDHS, 835 F.3d 422, 439–41 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 581–82 (1889)).
258. Id. Cf. Texas v. Biden, 554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 857–58 (N.D. Tex. 2021).
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federal government to police U.S. borders on a eugenic basis without limitation.259
This part is dedicated to the martialing of legal language to flip the
script of plenary power doctrine in immigrant habeas court.260 By flipping
the script, I simply mean to adopt the popular meaning of the idiom,261 i.e.,
of taking the usual script that plenary powers doctrine requires after Chae
Chan Ping and flipping it on its head or otherwise revealing it as fallacious,
absurd, or unworkable.262 Flipping the script of plenary power doctrine is
not a final, end-game strategy like arguing that the plenary power ideology
should be overruled as anathema to McCulloch v. Maryland’s conception of
federal powers as not plenary, but limited and supreme.263 However, such
an argument to overrule plenary power doctrine under McCulloch may be
helped along by the following strategies of flipping the script of plenary powers.264
It is highly unlikely that plenary power doctrine will be brought down
anytime soon by the direct attack of a single immigration attorney in habeas

259. Castro, 835 F.3d at 439–41 (“The case that first recognized the political branches’ plenary
authority to exclude aliens [was] Chae Chan Ping [a.k.a. The Chinese Exclusion Case].”).
260. See, e.g., id.
261. Flipping the script is a popular idiom in the United States that means: “To reverse a situation, especially by doing something unexpected.” WIKTIONARY: THE FREE DICTIONARY,
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/flip_the_script. See Karla V. Zelaya, Sweat the Technique: Visibleizing Praxis Through Mimicry in Phillis Wheatley’s “On Being Brought from Africa to America”
106–08 (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation) https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/484/ (demonstrating how the strategy of “[f]ollowing the script” of an oppressor may be used in an argument
against oppression).
262. For example, prior to the eugenic era there were several cases that made decisions premised on plenary powers; but the script they followed on this topic was oftentimes different from the
script that emerged from Chae Chan Ping. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824)
(asserting federal plenary power to overrule a state steamboat patent that, among other things,
would restrict immigration to New York); New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139 (1837) (asserting
the countervailing idea of state plenary powers or police powers to uphold a state immigration law
under an early expression of the public charge doctrine), overruled by Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (extending a fundamental right to immigrate between the states); id. at 177–
78 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the bases of the fundamental right of emigration asserted
in Edwards); id. at 184–85 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The mere state of being without funds is a
neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color. I agree with what I understand to be the holding of the Court that cases which may indicate the contrary are overruled.”).
263. Schroeder, We Will, supra note 176, at 54; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405
(1819); Castro, 835 F.3d at 439–41 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 581–
82 (1889)); DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 2004–05 (2020) (citing Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882, 22 Stat. 58; The Scott Act, 25 Stat. 504; Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1085; Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)). Cf. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197.
264. See, e.g., Blanche Bong Cook, Johnny Appleseed: Citizenship Transmission Laws and a
White Heteropatriarchal Property Right in Philandering, Sexual Exploitation, and Rape (the
“WHP”) or Johnny and the WHP, 31 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, 134 (2019); Saito, supra note
122, at 1135–36, 1175.
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court.265 Nevertheless, as Professor Blanche Bong Cook inspiringly concluded in her recent critique of plenary power doctrine, “‘Power concedes
nothing without a demand.’ Power is neither natural nor inevitable. It is
made. And it can be unmade.”266 For however long plenary power doctrine
persists, habeas attorneys may learn such ways of talking about plenary powers that could one day lead to its undoing.267
For example, it appears that the simplest way to stop a federal court
from deferring to the political branches’ plenary power would be to emphasize a disagreement between the political branches.268 Along these lines,
Boumediene extended jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of foreign nationals specifically to resolve separation of powers controversies.269 Plenary
power doctrine does not provide a way to resolve disagreements between
Congress, the president, and the courts, because it is a doctrine of prudential
deference that depends upon the existence of an agreed upon political policy
to which the court can defer.270
It likely would not hurt an immigrant habeas petition to name Congress’
strong disagreement with former President Trump’s assertions of plenary
power over elections in a bid to overrule the results of the 2020 election
through kraken lawsuits.271 However, there is something far closer to home
for immigration lawyers to discuss, which is Congress’ disagreement with
the executive branch over time, date, and location information on Notices to

265. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–66 n.6 (1972).
266. Cook, supra note 264, at 134 (quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Speech before the West
Indian Emancipation Society, in TWO SPEECHES BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS 22 (1857)).
267. Id. at 111–15 (showing us how to attack several versions of plenary power doctrine).
268. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 00:10, Niz-Chavez v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 84 (2020) (No. 19-863),
https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/72822/niz-chavez-v-barr/; Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct.
1474, 1478–79 (2021); Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 888–90 (9th Cir. 2020).
269. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008).
270. See, e.g., DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2021).
271. Motion of Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to Intervene in his Personal
Capacity as Candidate for Re-Election, Proposed Bill of Complaint in Intervention, and Brief in
Support of Motion to Intervene at 8, 26, 32, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020) (No.
22O155) (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35
(1892)) (asserting a “direct violation of the plenary power that Article II of the U.S. Constitution
confers on the Legislatures of the States”); U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight
and Reform, Selected Documents: President Trump Pressure Campaign on Dept. of Justice (June
2021) (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35 (“the practical construction of the clause has conceded
plenary power to the state legislature in the matter of the appointment of electors”)).
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Appear (“NTAs”).272 The executive branch boldly disobeys IIRIRA’s requirements of putting time, date, and location information on NTAs, which
are cited for jurisdiction in most defensive removal cases.273
In Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, the Court sided with
Congress over the executive branch on immigration policy.274 A general
principle that may be drawn from these cases is that the executive branch
may not rely upon prudential deference standards to avoid statutory law; ergo
the executive branch alone does not have plenary power to deport immigrants like Thuraissigiam.275 The litigation over NTAs, which play a central
role in most defensive immigration suits,276 supports the idea that the court
does not usually defer to the political branches’ plenary powers when they
are not in alignment.277
Furthermore, there are several pre-Chae Chan Ping cases that asserted
early versions of plenary power doctrine to extend federal jurisdiction in order to encourage immigration to the United States, providing another basis
to flip the script of plenary power doctrine.278 These cases were recently
extended powerfully in NFIB v. Sebelius to affirm Obamacare.279 Health law

272. Oral Argument at 00:10, Niz-Chavez v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 84 (2020) (No. 19-863),
https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/72822/niz-chavez-v-barr/; Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct.
1474, 1478–79 (2021), extended by Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F. 4th 351, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2021);
see Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018). The Board of Immigration Appeals, an executive department tribunal organized within the Department of Justice, distinguished Niz-Chavez
and the Fifth Circuit decision Rodriguez. Matter of LaParra, 28 I&N Dec. 425, 435–36 (BIA 2022)
(allowing removal proceedings to continue that are initiated by NTAs that clearly violate the statutory mandate as well as the clear meaning of the statutory mandate given by the U.S. Supreme
Court in both Niz-Chavez and Pereira, ignoring Rodriguez).
273. See AILA, Featured Issue: The Pereira Ruling and Resulting Fake NTAs, AILA Doc. No.
19082210, (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/the-pereira-ruling.
274. Compare Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1478–79, and Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113, with
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982 (deciding that the non-EOIR “process” of a credible fear interview is sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, even though no unbiased decision maker (not
even an IJ) reviews these decisions to see whether they complied with the law or not).
275. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1478–79; Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113. In Niz-Chavez and Pereira
the Court explained that it does actually matter if the executive branch follows the law when it is
unambiguous. Cf. Featured Issue: The Pereira Ruling and Resulting Fake NTAs, AILA Doc. No.
19082210 (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.aila.org/infonet/the-pereira-ruling.
276. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14; 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G); Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 401 (9th Cir.
2019).
277. See, e.g., Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1478–79; Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113.
278. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197(1824); In re Kaine, 55 U.S. 103, 110–13 (1853); United
States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 626–32 (1888); see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–06
(2001). See also Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 446 (1827). Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 429 (1819).
279. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 550 (2012) (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197).
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cases like Sebelius may be drawn upon in the immigration context, because
historically they trace back to the same source of law.280
As Sebelius revealed, the federal court is still empowered to say what
the law is.281 Boumediene demonstrated even more acutely how saying what
the law is can help the court flip the script of a problematic former opinion
in order to keep what serves the court and discard that which is unhelpful.282
In doing so, Boumediene was able to preserve what served the court from the
Hamdi plurality opinion embodied by this statement,
Likewise, we have made clear that, unless Congress acts to suspend it,
the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a
necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance,
serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in
the realm of detentions.283

Boumediene accepted and extended this statement, meaning if habeas is not
suspended, then the Court must continue “to play a necessary role” by asserting jurisdiction over habeas corpus writs.284 However, Boumediene also
flipped the script of Hamdi, by justifying the lower courts’ discharge of the
prisoners instead of remanding a Mathews balancing test on a military tribunal.285 This strategy may be repeated in the immigration context going forward, as Thuraissigiam’s citation of plenary power doctrine came from Landon v. Plasencia, a non-habeas case that remanded a Mathews balancing
test.286

280. Id. at 570–71 (citing to the Obamacare individual mandate as a “capitation (also known
as a ‘head tax’ or a ‘poll tax’)”); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 403 (1849) (Opinion of McLean,
J.) (“The act of New York now under consideration is called a health law. It imposes a tax on the
master and every cabin passenger of a vessel from a foreign port . . . .”). See Miln, 36 U.S. at 141–
42, overruled by Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177; see also Wendy E. Parmet, The Plenary Power Meets
the Police Power: Federalism at the Intersection of Health & Immigration, 45 AM J. L. & MED.
224, 239 (2019).
281. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 538 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)); id. at
550; see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177–78).
282. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177–78); id. at 733–34 (citing
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion)). Cf. Lithwick, Nevermind, supra
note 123.
283. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion), quoted by Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
284. Id.
285. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 784 (“Setting aside the fact that the relevant language in Hamdi
did not garner a majority of the Court, it does not control the matter at hand.”); id. at 792 (overruling
MCA § 7 as an “unconstitutional suspension of the writ,” which allowed the petitioners to advance
their “request [for] an order of release”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
286. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35)) (denying jurisdiction, where Landon
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Perhaps, as the majority in Thuraissigiam implied, a Mathews balancing test for potentially more administrative process was the incorrect habeas
remedy in Hamdi,287 but this in itself did not clearly justify Thuraissigiam’s
denial of jurisdiction based on Landon.288 For, as occurred in Landon, the
recognition of plenary power doctrine was not sufficient to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.289 In another example, Trump v. Hawaii acknowledged plenary power doctrine but maintained jurisdiction, to “look behind the face of
the Proclamation.”290
Therefore, attorneys may likewise ask the court to look behind the face
of the plenary power of exclusion itself.291 What the court will find, if it
looks, is sheer eugenic ideology shamelessly built upon antebellum slavery
law.292 The plenary power of exclusion, as encapsulated by Harry Laughlin’s
eugenics propaganda, envisioned the exclusion of all immigrants for the purpose of only admitting immigrants with “fit” genes.293 The post-WWII
amendments to immigration law attempted to remove unequal treatment in
immigration exclusion, but did not repeal the 1924 policy of general exclusion as a fundamentally racist, misogynist, and ableist policy.294
Congress never gave another rationale, other than eugenic ideology, for
asserting general exclusion at U.S. borders.295 Two colorable arguments
spring from this reality: (1) that the eugenic basis of immigration law is an
asserted it). Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 825 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Landon, 459 U.S.
at 34–35).
287. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1978 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 563 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
288. Id. at 1982 (quoting Landon, 459 U.S. at 32).
289. Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1978.
290. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).
291. Id.
292. Schroeder, We Will, supra note 176, at 47–48 (explaining how Prigg and Dred Scott led
to Chae Chan Ping and noting: “The plenary power doctrine was adopted, directly from Joseph
Story’s dissent in Houston v. Moore, in Prigg and the Passenger Cases’ interpretation of the Fugitive Slaves and Slave Trade Clauses as a source of unbounded power.”).
293. HARRY HAMILTON LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 349–
50, 360 (1922) (asserting federal plenary power to police immigration at U.S. national borders);
Randall D. Bird & Garland Allen, The J.H.B. Archive Report The Papers of Harry Hamilton Laughlin, Eugenicist, 14 J. HIST. BIO. 339, 339–40 (1981); 65 CONG. REC. H4,570–75 (Mar. 20, 1924)
(remarks of Rep. Samuel Dickstein); 65 CONG. REC. H5,677–81 (Apr. 5, 1924) (containing a portion of Harry Laughlin’s testimony and report); 65 CONG. REC. H6,284–89 (Apr. 12, 1924) (remarks of Rep. John Kindred); see Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (establishing the first
system that excluded all immigrants from every nation as the general rule rather than the exception).
Cf. Alex Nowrasteh, Reflections on the Immigration Act of 1924, CATO AT LIBERTY (June 1, 2016,
4:25 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/reflections-immigration-act-1924.
294. Nowrasteh, supra note 293.
295. Id.; Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (establishing general exclusion of immigrants
pursuant to a visa system for the first time); Hart-Celler Act, 79 Stat. 911 (extending the general
exclusion principle, without justifying it on another basis than eugenics even though eugenics was
debunked by the time of this law’s enactment).
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illegitimate usurpation of state police powers as described in NFIB v. Sebelius;296 and (2) that purifying the genes of the human race was not a legitimate end, and eugenics was not an appropriate means to that end as required
under McCulloch.297 Either of these arguments could eventually justify the
overruling of INA as it presently exists.298
As Justice Ginsburg once quipped: “the Court should never be influenced by the weather of the day but inevitably they will be influenced by the
climate of the era.”299 It may, therefore, be helpful to notice the anti-eugenics
climate shift currently underway.300 Britney Spears’ highly publicized incourt statement that helped to put an end to her conservatorship provided
important sidelights on the new reparation law for victims of eugenics in
California that Kelli Dillon and Cynthia Chandler pushed through the legislature.301 The new California law followed similar enactments shepherded
through the legislatures of Virginia and North Carolina by Mark Bold.302

296. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 550 (2012) (deciding the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate overstepped Congress’ Commerce Clause power). Cf. Page Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 477
(excluding a class of immigrants for the first time in federal law and citing to classic police powers
purposes; i.e., specifically, the avoidance of lewdness and immorality was its primary purpose).
297. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are
Constitutional.”), quoted by Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 537.
298. See, e.g., Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 550.
299. Transcript: Interview with Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, THE TAKEAWAY
(Sept. 15, 2013), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/takeaway/segments/transcript-interviewjustice-ruth-bader-ginsburg (quoting Paul Freund) (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. See Sara Luterman, For Women Under Conservatorship, Forced Birth Control Is Routine,
THE NATION (July 15, 2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/conservatorship-iud-britney-spears/; Mary Harris, For the Disability Community, Britney Spears’ Situation Is All Too Familiar, SLATE (June 29, 2021, 12:04 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2021/06/britneyspears-conservatorship-guardianship-disability.html (explaining how Buck v. Bell remains good
law and continues to justify state level nonconsensual sterilization); cf. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 364 (1978); Treatment of Certain Payments in Eugenics Compensation Act, 130 Stat.
976 (exempting payments made from state eugenics compensation programs from consideration in
determining eligibility for, or the amount of, federal public benefits).
301. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24210; BELLY OF THE BEAST (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (explaining the activism of Kelli Dillon and Cynthia Chandler). Cf. Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. 75–
2057, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20423, at *1 (9th Cir. 1978) (directly affirming Buck v. Bell in California without an available opinion); Stump, 435 U.S. at 364. See Amanda Morris, ‘You Just Feel
Like Nothing’: California to Pay Sterilization Victims, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/11/us/california-reparations-eugenics.html.
302. Va. Admin. Code, 12 VAC 35-240-10; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B–426.50; G: Unfit,
RADIOLAB (July 15, 2021), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/g-unfit [hereinafter G: Unfit]. See also Eric Eyre, W.Va. House passes repeal of forced sterilization law,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/wva-house-passes-repeal-of-forced-sterilization-law/article_21dd1f3c-778c-5c34-828f781451c44e52.html.
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Scholarship is also surging forward into the topic of eugenics and its
origin in the United States, with relevant connections to immigration law.303
For example, after discussing Britney Spears’ situation on the air, author
Lulu Miller announced her forthcoming book Why Fish Don’t Exist that explains the founding president of Stanford University David Starr Jordan’s
anti-immigration role in the eugenics movement.304 Also, after studying how
the American eugenics programs inspired Nazi Germany, Professor Whitman of Yale Law School wrote in summation,
As one leading Nazi author summarized American immigration history in 1933, ‘[u]ntil the 1880s, a liberal freedom-oriented conception
led the United States to regard itself as the refuge of all oppressed
peoples, and consequently limitations on immigration, to say nothing
of bans on immigration, were considered irreconcilable with the ‘free’
Constitution.’ . . . [However, l]ate nineteenth-century American immigration legislation was directed in particular against Asians, beginning especially with the Chinese exclusion legislation in California in
the 1870s, and on the national level in 1882.305

There is nothing about plenary power doctrine that requires the court to ignore an inquiry into the statutory means and ends of immigration law during
the eugenics era, especially if remaining silent could implicitly endorse Nazism at the expense of Boumediene’s six clear holdings.306 In fact,
Boumediene already rejected plenary power doctrine with these words: “To
hold the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or
off at will . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of
government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not
this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”307

303. See generally LULU MILLER, WHY FISH DON’T EXIST (2021); JAMES Q. WHITMAN,
HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW (2017);
ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES (2016); THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS (2016);
PAMELA NEWKIRK, SPECTACLE: THE ASTONISHING LIFE OF OTA BENGA (2015); NANCY J.
PAREZO & DON D. FOWLER, ANTHROPOLOGY GOES TO THE FAIR (2009); VICTORIA NOURSE, IN
RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR-TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS
(2008); ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION (2005); WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A
BETTER RACE (2001).
304. G: Unfit, supra note 302 (citing generally DAVID STARR JORDAN, THE HUMAN HARVEST
(1907)), referring to MILLER, supra note 303, at 168 (David Starr Jordan “was a pacifist as a means
of accomplishing his eugenicist ends”); see JORDAN, supra note 304, at 78 (proposing strict, unjust
immigration policies as an alternative to war).
305. WHITMAN, supra note 303, at 34–37.
306. See supra notes 13, 265–68, 284 and accompanying text. See also WHITMAN, supra note
303, at 34–37.
307. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. 137,
177 (1803)).
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This sentiment was strongly affirmed after Thuraissigiam in Al Otro
Lado v. Mayorkas, in which a federal district court ordered immigrant “turnbacks” unconstitutional according to Boumediene’s functional approach.308
As part of its opinion, Al Otro Lado noted that the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”), originally enacted in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, is still
viable in immigration suits under Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.309 As attorneys
at Al Otro Lado (“AOL”) demonstrated, this statute is a viable way to raise
international law principles so that the court may uphold treaty obligations
even if the court’s ruling relies on grounds other than the ATS.310
Using the standards cited in Al Otro Lado, future suits looking to use
ATS to raise the eugenic foundations of INA to the court’s attention may
argue that anti-Nazism is a “jus cogens norm” that universally exists.311 This
norm was strongly affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, a case celebrated in the film Woman in Gold in which
the U.S. Supreme Court’s international power was asserted over a foreign
republic to vindicate an immigrant’s property rights.312 Righting the wrongs
of the Holocaust, and by extension its genocidal roots in U.S. eugenic policies, is a jus cogens norm actionable under the ATS; a court that says otherwise acts on mere prudential bases.313
It may be worth noting that eugenic systems were always premised on
cost/benefit analyses to justify their existence.314 In response, immigration

308. Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *58, *63
(S.D. Cal. 2021).
309. Id. at *63 (quoting ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004))); Sosa, 542 U.S. at
729. Cf. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 116 (1784); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746
(quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–01 (2001)).
310. See Al Otro Lado, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128, at *66 (noting that under current ATS
precedent the Court needs a “specific, universal, and obligatory” principle to move forward under
ATS that was not made apparent for the Court at the time of its decision).
311. Id. at *71 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429, 431 n.5 (D.N.J. 2000); see Darcie L. Christopher, Jus Cogens, Reparation Agreements, and Holocaust Slave Labor Litigation, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1227, 1227–
28 (2000). Cf. Scott Simon, Explaining, Again, The Nazis’ True Evil, NPR (Aug. 19, 2017, 7:53
AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/19/544641070/explaining-again-thenazis-true-evil.
312. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2004); WOMAN IN GOLD (BBC
Films 2015). Cf. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 144 (2014).
313. See Nur Iqbal Kara, Screening Syndromes Out: Updating the International “Genocide”
Vernacular for a Changing Technological Age, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 163, 178–79 (2020); Frumkin
v. JA Jones, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 374 (D. N.J. 2001) (dismissing under political question
doctrine); id. at 386 (also citing international comity); but see id. at 389–90.
314. BELLY OF THE BEAST 48:05 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (eugenics propagandists “had always
used cost/benefit as the justifier for why they were doing what they were doing” – statement of
investigative reporter Corey Johnson); id. at 1:15:41. See LAUGHLIN, supra note 293, at 454; Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905)). The
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attorneys are using the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) to flip the script
of eugenics cost/benefit rationales by shifting the costs of the worst of
Trump’s immigration policies to the government.315 Like the recent reparation statutes in California, Virginia, and North Carolina,316 the FTCA suits
led by attorneys at the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (“ASAP”) ensure
that eugenics-based immigration policies will never seem “worth it” again.317
Noting these reparation efforts in habeas court should help preclude federal
habeas judges from repeating the old line from eugenics, which was that the
benefits of excluding (especially non-white) immigrants through nonconsensual sterilization,318 child separation,319 and other public-charge-based deterrence efforts outweighed the costs.320
Finally, the joint recipients of the 2021 Nobel Prize for economics, especially David Card and Joshua Angrist, proved that increased immigration
does not have a negative economic impact on destination countries.321 The
principle in Jacobson is a cost/benefit balancing test. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24 (stating that “the
risk of such an injury” should be “weighed as against the benefits”).
315. BELLY OF THE BEAST 1:15:41 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020). See Sarah Stillman, How Families
Separated at the Border Could Make the Government Pay, NEW YORKER (June 15, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-families-separated-at-the-border-could-makethe-government-pay [hereinafter Stillman, How] (citing FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346).
316. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 24210; Va. Admin. Code, 12 VAC 35-240-10; N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143B–426.50; see Treatment of Certain Payments in Eugenics Compensation Act, 130 Stat.
976; BELLY OF THE BEAST 1:15:41 (Erika Cohn dir., 2020) (“We have yet to get an apology, we
have yet to be acknowledged. We have to crack this thing wide open. CDC has to be made accountable.” – statement of survivor Kelli Dillon); Ailsa Chang et al., A Survivor Reacts to California’s
Reparations Program for Forced Sterilizations, NPR (July 21, 2021, 4:03 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/21/1018924484/a-survivor-reacts-to-californias-reparations-program-for-forced-sterilizations; Gary Robertson, Compensating for the Priceless, RICHMOND MAG.
(May 4, 2016, 9:43 AM), https://richmondmagazine.com/news/features/compensating-for-thepriceless/.
317. Stillman, How, supra note 315.
318. See Maya Manian, Sterilization: History Tragically Repeats Itself, ACLU (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/immigration-detention-and-coerced-sterilization-history-tragically-repeats-itself/.
319. See Rachel Monahan, An Oregon Law Professor Visited Children at the Border and Told
the World of the Horrors, WILLAMETTE WEEK (July 3, 2019, 5:31 AM),
https://www.wweek.com/news/courts/2019/07/03/an-oregon-law-professor-visited-children-atthe-border-and-told-the-world-of-the-horrors/; cf. Caitlin Dickerson, “We Need to Take Away Children.”, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2022), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/09/trump-administration-family-separation-policy-immigration/670604/ (confirming
that the child separation policy was a conscious deterrence effort by the Trump administration).
320. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248).
321. Christopher Rugaber et al., 3 US-Based Economists Win Nobel for Research on Wages,
Jobs, AP NEWS (Oct. 11, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/nobel-prizes-business-europe3cbc672f994ae6f4f486a68b52c2bb32 (“By comparing the evolution of wages and employment in
four other cities, Card discovered no negative effects [from increased immigration] for Miami resident with low levels of education. Follow-up work showed that increased immigration can have a
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research of Card and Angrist appears to debunk old eugenic dogmas that
underpinned the U.S. policy of general exclusion that began in 1924.322 If
increased immigration of unskilled laborers does not create a net cost for
U.S. society, then Congress’ recitation of eugenics to justify general exclusion no longer satisfies its burden of expressing an intelligible principle for
excluding immigrants from entry by statute.323
This argument is also supported by groundbreaking economic studies
of the effects of the illegal repatriation of over 2 million U.S. citizens and
legal immigrants of Mexican ancestry in the 1930s.324 The surreptitious attack on U.S. communities of Mexican ancestry in the 1930s was justified as
a defense of the white working class.325 But economic studies later proved
that the 1930s repatriation program deepened the Great Depression for everyone, which seems to support the idea that laws for the general exclusion of
immigrants may similarly contribute to economic downturn with no provable
benefits, and thus may not actually satisfy the extremely broad test from
McCulloch v. Maryland regarding Congress’ “choice of means.”326

positive impact on income for people born in the country.”); see David Card, Immigrant Inflows,
Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration, 19 J. LABOR ECON.
22, 56–58 (2001); Joshua D. Angrist & Adriana D. Kugler, Protective or Counter-Productive?
Labour Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives, 113 ECON. J. F302, F328
(2003); David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? 24–26, 115 ECON. J. F300, F321-22
(2005), https://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/new-immig.pdf.
322. See sources cited supra note 321; Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153 (establishing the
policy of general exclusion for the first time according to the false economic prognostications of
Harry Laughlin and other eugenicists).
323. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (according to non-delegation
doctrine, Congress cannot delegate the power to the executive branch to supply an intelligible principle for its legislation).
324. Schroeder, Leviathan, supra note 58, at 29.
325. Jongkwan Lee et al., The Employment Effects of Mexican Repatriations: Evidence from
the 1930’s, NBER Working Paper 23885, at 24 (2017), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23885/w23885.pdf (“Politicians at that time argued that this would give jobs to American workers and attenuate the unemployment problems caused by the Great Depression.”).
326. Id. (“Given the large amount of pain, disruption and suffering that this campaign caused
to Mexicans and their families, it is crucial to notice that it did not deliver any of the labor market
benefits promised to natives. In fact, our estimates suggest that it may have further increased their
levels of unemployment and depressed their wages.”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421,
424 (1819) (giving the broad standard for Congressional legislative power under the Necessary &
Proper Clause, which laws that generally exclude immigrants may not actually satisfy: “Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution, are Constitutional.”); but see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842)
(giving a classic Hegelian plenary power ends justify the means rationale that contradicted McCulloch: “The fundamental principle applicable to all cases of this sort would seem to be that, where
the end is required, the means are given, and where the duty is enjoined, the ability to perform it is
contemplated to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is entrusted.”).
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Conclusion: Moving Immigrant Writs Out of the Shadows and
Into the Light
For the most part, Eric Bollman’s immigration status remains undiscussed in the United States.327 His case is not usually hailed as an example
of how immigrants should be treated in federal courts.328 Bollman was not
emphasized in Thuraissigiam, and thus the Court did not say that an immigrant requesting habeas release like Bollman might also open a path to citizenship if a habeas judge is interested in ordering such enforcement.329
The six approaches given above will keep this option on the table for
federal judges, while still allowing immigration attorneys to seek shadow
wins and other kinds of soft administrative relief.330 However, as Thuraissigiam demonstrated, there are times when the only strategy left for an immigrant is to walk into the light, by filing a public habeas petition.331 For those
faced with this choice, a few more little known facts about Eric Bollman
might inspire.332
Prior to petitioning the court for habeas corpus release, Bollman was
offered a pardon from President Jefferson that Bollman refused to accept,
because he would not testify against his friends.333 Then on Bollman’s day
in Court, it was the president who lost and the immigrant who won.334 Because of Bollman’s courageous perseverance, his case is now cited as a representation of the constitutional minimum of habeas corpus review required
for all Americans.335
The possible upside of petitioning a federal habeas court, is that it can
issue precedent in the full light of public view that future immigrants may

327. See, e.g., DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1984 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 94 (1807)). Cf. Sweet, supra note 1, at 582, 586 (explaining
Bollman’s immigrant status).
328. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1984 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Bollman, 8 U.S. at 94).
329. Id. at 1969 n.12.
330. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
331. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969.
332. See, e.g., James Wesley Baker, The Imprisonment of Lafayette, AMERICAN HERITAGE
(June 1977), https://www.americanheritage.com/imprisonment-lafayette.
333. See Jonathan Turley, Trump Was Wrong to Pardon Arpaio, But Other Presidents Have
Done Worse, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2017, 3:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/08/28/trump-wrong-to-pardon-arpaio-but-other-presidents-worse-jonathan-turley-column/606223001/.
334. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 136. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 20, 1807)
(using very colorful language to complain about his losses in court).
335. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746, 779 (2008) (citing Bollman, 8 U.S. at
136 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 14)). Cf. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1969 n.12.
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benefit from.336 As emphasized above, successful immigrant precedents
have rebounded to the benefit of all U.S. citizens, opening new avenues of
judicial review to everyone.337 Like Bollman, an immigrant may make a
precedent that causes several others to be released as a result, either by future
habeas writs or by forcing the executive branch to change its policies.338
After four years of Trump, the general feeling is that the president may
no longer be implicitly trusted by the courts.339 A majority of federal Circuit
Courts that were previously silent about whether or not they could review
immigration court sua sponte reversed course in favor of habeas corpus review.340 These courts signaled they will no longer blindly defer immigration
matters to the executive, regardless of the current party preference of the
president.341
Some may still perceive habeas corpus for immigrants as a mere aspiration.342 Some federal judges appear hesitant to draw Trump’s harsh immigration policies into question even now,343 though others may be more willing.344 Still, in times of extreme uncertainty there is one thing of which we
336. See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 165–66 (1943) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“Immediately, we are concerned with only one
man, William Schneiderman. Actually, though indirectly, the decision affects millions.”).
337. Woodby, 385 U.S. at 286, extended by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 n.10
(1967); see supra notes 147–48. But see Transcript: ‘Fox, supra note 243.
338. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting Bollman, 8 U.S. at 136) (“where imprisonment is unlawful, the court ‘can only direct [the prisoner] to be discharged’”); Schneiderman,
320 U.S. at 165–66 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
339. See Rosalind S. Helderman & Elise Viebeck, ‘The Last Wall’: How Dozens of Judges
Across the Political Spectrum Rejected Trump’s Efforts to Overturn the Election, WASH POST.
(Dec. 12, 2020, 11:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judges-trump-election-lawsuits/2020/12/12/e3a57224-3a72-11eb-98c425dc9f4987e8_story.html?utm_campaign=wp_todays_headlines&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_headlines; see, e.g.,
Thompson v. Barr, 959 F.3d 476, 483 (1st Cir. 2020).
340. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 491; Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759–60 (9th Cir.
2020).
341. See, e.g., Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 41 (1999) (“As such, it is left to the discretion of the
BIA and is not subject to review by this court.”), superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D),
as recognized in Thompson, 959 F.3d at 480–84.
342. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUMBIA L. REV.
SIDEBAR 42, 58 (2010).
343. See, e.g., Texas v. Biden, 554 F. Supp. 3d 818, 847–48, 857–58 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (finding
that the termination of the Migrant Protection Protocols violated the Administrative Procedures
Act, and enjoining the Biden administration from ending it through an executive memorandum),
application for stay denied, 142 S. Ct. 926 (2021) (citing DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S Ct. 1891 (2020)), rev’d, No. 21–954, slip op. (2022).
344. See, e.g., Al Otro Lado v. Mayorkas, No. 17-cv-02366, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167128,
at *62–63, *72 (S.D. Cal. 2021); Thompson, 959 F.3d at 491; Lopez-Marroquin, 955 F.3d at 759–
60; Ms. L. v. ICE, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (ordering the government to end
the child separation policy through preliminary injunction); John Gramlich, How Border Apprehensions, ICE Arrests and Deportations Have Changed under Trump, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 2,
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can be certain: “It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out
how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done
them better.”345
Some lawyers may fall into cynicism, but others will enter the arena.346
Only those who assert habeas corpus may confirm whether the Suspension
Clause is a “meaningless shibboleth.”347 Or to say this another way, the fate
foreseen in Kafka’s parable Before the Law need not concern those who
boldly enter through the gateway,348 because even in failure a well-drawn
habeas petition can illuminate a path forward for all of us.349

2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrestsand-deportations-have-changed-under-trump/.
345. BRENÉ BROWN: THE CALL TO COURAGE (Netflix, Apr. 19, 2019) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, Citizenship in a Republic, Apr. 23, 1910, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-sorbonne-paris-france-citizenship-republic).
346. Id.; Roosevelt, supra note 345 (“Let the man of learning, the man of lettered leisure, beware of that queer and cheap temptation to pose to himself and to others as a cynic, as the man who
has outgrown emotions and beliefs, the man to whom good and evil are as one. The poorest way to
face life is to face it with a sneer.”); OCTAVIO PAZ, THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE 20–21 (Lysander
Kemp trans., 1961) (commenting on “the United States man,” saying: “He is alone among his
works, lost—to use the phrase by José Gorostiza—in a ‘wilderness of mirrors.’”); id. at 49; id. at
212.
347. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 327 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
348. Franz Kafka, Before the Law [1915], available at https://www.kafka-online.info/beforethe-law.html.
349. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908); THE CONSPIRATOR 1:53:04 (Lionsgate 2010).
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